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According to the literature and statistical figures, professional drivers constitute a 
high-risk group in traffic and should be investigated in connection with the factors 
related to safe driving. However, safety-related behaviours and outcomes among 
professional drivers have attracted very little attention from safety researchers. In 
addition, comparing different professional and non-professional driver groups in 
terms of critical on-the-road characteristics and outcomes has been indicated in the 
literature as being necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of driver 
groups and the nature of driving itself. The aim of the present study was to 
investigate professional driving from a safety climate stand point in relation to 
predominant driving-related factors and by considering the differences between 
driver groups. Hence, four Sub-studies were conducted according to a framework 
emphasizing the relationships between safety climate, driver groups, driver stress, 
human factors (i.e., driver behaviour and performance) and accidents. Demographic 
information, as well as data for driver behaviour, performance, and driver stress was 
collected by questionnaire. The data was analysed using factor analysis, analysis of 
covariance as well as hierarchical and logistic regression analysis. The results 
revealed multi-dimensional factor structures for the safety climate measures. 
Considering the relationships between variables, differences were evidenced 
regarding on-the-road stress reactions, risky driver behaviours and penalties, 
between the various professional and non-professional driver groups. Driver stress 
was found to be related to accidents. The results also indicated that the safety 
climate has positive relationships with both driver behaviour and performance, and as 
well as involvement in accidents. The present study has a number of critical 
implications resulting from the fact that the way in which the effects of safety climate 
on professional driving were investigated, as well as the differences between 
professional and non-professional driver groups, was unique. Additionally, for the first 
time, a safety climate scale was developed specifically for professional drivers. 
According to the results of the study and to previous literature, a tentative model was 
proposed representing a possible route for the relationships between safety climate, 
human factors, driver stress, driver groups and accidents, by emphasizing the effects 
of safety climate. 
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1.1 General Introduction 
More than 1.2 million people die each year on the roads, while between 20 and 50 
million people suffering non-fatal injuries (World Health Organization [WHO], 2009). 
Road traffic accidents are on the way of being one of the first leading causes of death 
within the next 20 years. Although road transportation has benefits for the wellbeing 
of people, government, economic market, and health of the society in general by 
providing access; it might also have negative impacts, like the effects on individual 
lives and the economic cost, if the conditions it takes place are not safe enough. 
Professional drivers, i.e., people whose job is driving, constitute a high risk group in 
terms of road traffic accidents worldwide (see Baker et al., 1976). According to 
Charbotel et al. (2002), the main cause of occupational fatalities is road accidents in 
many countries. For example, about 25% of fatal work-related accidents in the USA 
(Toscano & Windau, 1994); approximately 25% of the fatal work accidents in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and nearly 40% of fatal work accidents in France 
(Charbotel et al., 2002) are road accidents.  
In the UK, traffic accidents were indicated to be the single largest cause of 
occupational fatality (Clarke et al., 2005); professional car drivers in the UK are about 
50% more likely to be involved in an accident as compared to non-professional 
drivers even after demographic variables and exposure is controlled for their effects 
(Lynn & Lockwood, 1998). In Australia, professional drivers on average reported a 
higher level of crash involvement compared to non-professional car drivers (Downs 
et al., 1999; Lynn & Lockwood, 1998). In addition, the phenomenon of work-related 
road fatalities has become the most common form of work-related injury with 
approximately 40 work-related road fatalities in each month (see Haworth et al., 
2000; Wheatley, 1997). In Turkey, more than 30% of fatal accidents (Trafik statistik 
Bülteni, 2009) are road accidents that professional drivers have been involved.  
These figures and related literature show the importance of investigating professional 
drivers in terms of the characteristics, factors, and conditions having relationship with 
their task of driving. Additionally, as the previous literature emphasized (see 
Rosenbloom & Shahar, 2007) it is necessary to examine the professional driver 
groups in terms of the comparison of some characteristics in itself as well as with 
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non-professional driver groups for more comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of professional and non-professional driving and safety related outcomes. 
1.2 Professional and non-professional driving  
Professional drivers are at a high risk of being involved in road traffic accidents due 
to their high annual mileage (Baker et al., 1976; Dorn & Brown, 2003). In addition, as 
compared to non-professional driving, professional driving requires different 
demands from drivers. Driving task demands for professional drivers are, for 
instance, largely pre-determined. However, driving is a more self-paced task for non-
professional drivers and they can largely determine the difficulty and risk level of their 
driving (Caird & Kline, 2004). Non-professional drivers can also choose the mode of 
transportation, time of travel, and target speed while driving. Driving is rather a less 
self-regulated task for professional drivers, because many different factors (e.g., time 
schedule, long working hours) increase their task demands. Professional driving has 
another distinct aspect: many organizational factors like a company’s culture, safety 
policy and practices as well as safety climate might determine how safely a 
professional driver drives. Moreover, a professional driver working for an organization 
has usually very limited possibility to influence these organizational factors (Caird & 
Kline, 2004). All these issues might create differences in the level and sources of 
stress for professional and non-professional drivers (Dorn & Brown, 2003). 
1.3 Accident: An outcome variable  
Results of the variety of studies investigating accidents showed that accident is not a 
simple ‘chance’ related or ‘cannot be anticipated’ type of event (Shinar, 2007). In the 
study of accidents two approaches have extensively used: clinical approach and 
epidemiological/statistical approach. In the clinical approach, which is the theory 
based one, post-hoc detailed analyses of events, behaviours and conditions 
preceding the crash/accident are done to define the causal categories. At the most 
sophisticated level of this approach, experts from different disciplines (e.g., 
behavioural science, engineering) conduct an independent investigation of the 
relevant issues related to his/her area of expertise. Instead, statistical approach 
followed a theory-free point of view arguing that statistical probabilities should be 
used to discuss causation. To accomplish this, two data sets are used. The first one 
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is the file with accidents; while the second one is used to provide exposure data (i.e., 
not containing accident information in it). If a particular behaviour (e.g., speeding) is 
observed at a certain frequency in the accident file, then the frequency of the same 
behaviour (speeding) is obtained from the exposure file of the behaviour of all drivers 
who drive the same roads at the same times as the drivers with crash data. If the 
frequency of the behaviour is more common in the crash file it might be argued that 
this behaviour is associated with a high risk of crash involvement, but not necessarily 
causation is inferred from such a data (Shinar, 2007). This is a difference between 
two approaches. In the clinical based approach people feel comfortable while using 
the term ‘cause’, whereas in the statistical approach, the term ‘risk’ is preferred. 
Thus, a theoretical framework is needed to determine a causal relationship to explain 
some factors, for example, why increasing speed should cause more accidents.  
According to the theoretical framework Turner (1978) focused on while exploring the 
accident occurrence, accidents are created through complex chains of events, with 
the accumulation of which, accident sequence is usually initiated long before the 
occurrence of the triggering event. According to Salmon et al. (2010) in the accident 
causation literature, human error models can be categorized as person approach 
(individual level errors are emphasized) or system approach (individual level errors 
are emphasized as being interacting with wider systematic errors/failures). Norman’s 
schema activation error model (Norman, 1981), Reason’s generic error modelling 
system (GEMS; Reason, 1990) and Rasmussen’s (1982) model of human 
malfunction might be included in the person based models of human error. The 
research based on person approach typically attempts to identify the nature and 
frequency of the errors made by operators within complex systems with the ultimate 
aim of operator-focussed strategies and countermeasures designed to reduce 
variability in human behaviour. Criticism towards this approach is related to focusing 
the error countermeasures specifically upon human behaviour rather than the 
conditions of wider system (Reason, 2000). According to Salmon et al. (2010) person 
approach is dominant in some areas like healthcare, in practice. However, as a 
dominant influential and widely recognized approach of the present time in principle 
(Reason, 2008) the system approach to human error and accident causation also 
highly applicable in various contexts. Especially Reason’s (1990) ‘Swiss cheese’ 
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model focusing on the latent conditions-unsafe acts interaction and their contribution 
to organizational accidents is now widely accepted and has been applied in most 
safety critical domains. The principles of the model are highly applicable in a road 
transport context as well. Nevertheless, some factors like the lack of appropriate 
methodologies, inadequate data collection systems, the resources required to 
undertake such applications, the open nature of the road transport system, and the 
placement of legal responsibility on individual drivers put back the system approach 
from implementations of its multi-dimensional applications within the road transport 
context (Salmon et al., 2010). Apart from the arguments on the theoretical point of 
view to accident occurrence there is a fact that accidents do not happen frequently as 
major injuries. For this reason, it may not be appropriate to use accidents as indices 
of unsafe behaviour, and the use of micro accidents that regarded as minor injuries 
requiring medical attention might be added in to the studies (Zohar, 2000). 
Nevertheless, regardless of the size of them, most road traffic accidents can directly 
be attributed to human factors as a sole or a contributory factor (Lewin, 1982).    
1.4 Human factors in driving: Driver behaviours and performance  
Human factors in driving can be investigated under two separate components: driver 
behaviours/style and performance/skills. Driver behaviour refers to the ways drivers 
choose to drive or habitually drive, including, for example, the choice of driving 
speed, habitual level of general attentiveness, and gap acceptance (Elander et al., 
1993). In other words it explains what drivers usually ‘do’. Although they become 
established over a period of years, driver behaviours do not necessarily get safer 
with driving experience. Driver performance includes information processing and 
motor, and safety skills, which improve with practice and training, that is, with driving 
experience. It explains the best the driver ‘can’ do in a given situation (Elander et al., 
1993). 
1.4.1 Driver behaviours: Errors, violations and positive driver behaviours 
Shinar (2007) claimed that a valid theory or model of behaviour is essential because 
it enables us to better understand on-the-road behaviours, predict driver’s reactions 
to potential safety measures, and develop new training programs, vehicle designs, 
highways, etc. The first models of behaviour (i.e., performance models emphasizing 
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the best a driver can do) were in cognitive psychology; the following model 
developers (i.e., motivational models emphasizing driver motivation) were from social 
psychology, personality and organizational behaviour (see Shinar, 2007 for a detailed 
explanation of theories and models of driver behaviour). Although several driving 
models have been developed to end up with a comprehensive one, the model 
developed by Reason et al. (1990) might be a turning point in the study of driver 
behaviours (Ranney, 1994).  
According to Reason (1990), driver behaviours can be roughly divided into two 
categories; errors and violations. This differentiation provided base for the 
development of the Manchester Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (the DBQ; Reason 
et al., 1990). The DBQ showed that driver errors, violations, and slips and lapses are 
three empirically distinct classes of behaviour. Reason et al. (1990) defined errors as 
‘the failure of planned actions to achieve their intended consequences’; violations as 
‘deliberate deviations from those practices believed necessary to maintain the safe 
operation of a potentially hazardous system’; and slips and lapses as attention and 
memory failures. Unlike errors, violations were seen as deliberate behaviours, 
although both errors and violations are potentially dangerous and might lead to a 
crash. Parker et al. (1995a) indicated that slips and lapses might cause 
embarrassment but are unlikely to have an impact on driving safety.  
Lawton et al. (1997) extended the DBQ by adding more items into the violations 
scale and split it into two distinctive scales, as ordinary violations and aggressive 
violations, according to the reason why drivers violate. Ordinary violations are 
deliberate deviations from safe driving without a specifically aggressive aim (e.g., 
speeding for saving time) whereas aggressive violations contain overtly aggressive 
acts (e.g., showing hostility by chasing other vehicles). Even though this addition of 
items have resulted in different factor solutions, the distinction between errors and 
violations, first shown by Reason et al. (1990), seem to be robust for private and 
professional drivers alike, both within and across different countries and cultures 
(Wallén Warner, 2006). The distinction between violations and errors is also 
supported by the findings showing that this two-factor solution was the most stable 
one (among possible solutions with two to six factors) over a three-year follow-up 
study in Finland (Özkan et al., 2006a). It should be noted that, concerning the 
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mentioned factor structure of the DBQ and in terms of traffic safety, speeding is a 
factor that should be taken into account specifically. It has direct and causal 
relationship with accident involvement (e.g., Aartsand & van Schagen, 2006; Carsten 
& Tate, 2005). Although in all countries there are rules for speeding while driving, and 
most drivers think that they are capable of choosing a safe speed; speed limits are 
widely violated (Elvik et al., 2004). In addition it has been shown as the most likely 
illegal behaviour to be reported by professional drivers (Davey et al., 2007). As 
compared to the other forms of violations like overtaking and close following; speed 
choice has been indicated as the most important driving style factor related to safety 
with a clear and consistent direction (see Elvik et al., 2004; Lajunen, 1997; Shinar, 
2007; Summala, 1996). It has been shown that although there were cross-cultural 
differences in frequencies of errors and violations, speeding did not show any cross-
cultural differences (Özkan et al., 2006a). Thus, in the present study, speeding has 
given particular attention and in addition to the speeding related violation items of the 
DBQ extra items were included within the study.  
Both violations and errors were labelled as aberrant, and therefore negative, 
behaviours. Focusing on negative behaviours is well justified in terms of traffic safety. 
Everyday driving, on the other hand, involves other behaviours that cannot be 
described as negative (Özkan & Lajunen, 2005). These behaviours either have to be 
based on coded rules/regulations, or primarily take safety into account. The main 
intention in these behaviours is to take care of the traffic environment or other road 
users; to help and to be polite towards them with or without safety concerns. For 
example, drivers may care about the (traffic) environment (e.g., avoid causing air 
pollution or congestion) or other road users (Özkan & Lajunen, 2005).  Positive driver 
behaviours include both passive (e.g., avoid causing delays or annoyance to other 
drivers) and active behaviours (e.g., moving to right side of the lane to ease 
overtaking, thanking by hand gesture). In order to extend the DBQ towards an 
omnibus measure of driver behaviour, Özkan and Lajunen (2005) added to the DBQ 
a scale for measuring positive driver behaviour and obtained a clear three-factor 





1.4.2 Driver performance: Perceptual-motor skills and safety skills 
As a skilled activity, driving task has several hierarchically organized distinct levels 
(Summala, 1987; 1996). These levels might be ordered in the following way from 
bottom to top: control (operational), manoeuvring (guidance) and planning 
(navigational) levels (Johannsen & Rouse, 1979; Michon, 1985; Mikkonen & 
Keskinen, 1980; Summala, 1987, 1996; Van der Molen & Bötticher, 1988). In the 
beginning of driving these functions need conscious control. However, with more 
practice and driving experience they become automated (Summala, 1987). 
Development of different skills might show differences; while some skills develop 
within shorter periods of time (i.e., basic motor skills); development of some others 
(i.e., perceptual skills) takes more time.   
Driver performance was differentiated as technical (i.e., quick and fluent car control, 
traffic situation management), and defensive driving skills (i.e., anticipatory accident 
avoidance skills) by Spolander (1983) who developed a self-report instrument to 
measure driving skills. Through this self-report instrument drivers were asked to take 
an external reference and compare themselves with ‘an average driver’ in thirteen 
aspects of driving. However, Spolander (1983) did not verify the empirical existence 
of these two factors in that questionnaire data through factor analysis. Those results 
addressed further clarification of the structure of self-assessed skill estimates based 
on the Spolander’s (1983) scales. Later, Hatakka et al. (1992) changed this external 
reference into an internal one due to a well known finding that the majority of the 
drivers assess themselves as better than average drivers in their skills (Näätänen & 
Summala, 1976; Svenson, 1981). This time the drivers were asked to assess their 
own abilities in different aspects of driving skills. The two original factors (defensive 
and other skills) of Spolander (1983) and Hatakka et al. (1992) overlapped 
somewhat. Lajunen and Summala (1995) extended the contents of the Hatakka et 
al.’s (1992) scale to find a solution to the model. They argued that safety related 
motives should be included in the assessment of driving skills because a driver’s 
view of himself/herself as a safe or dangerous driver may influence his/her driving 
style. As a result, they developed an instrument named the Driver Skill Inventory 
(DSI) to further assess both general perceptual-motor performance and safety 
concerns and verified the two-factor structure of the DSI as perceptual-motor and 
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safety skills. Lajunen and Summala (1995) suggested that the distinction between 
perceptual-motor (i.e., perception, decision making, motor control related skills) and 
safety skills (i.e., anticipatory accident avoidance skills) is a must because a driver’s 
internal balance between these skills reflects her/his attitude to safety. A consistent 
factor structure and high reliability of the DSI was obtained for different populations 
and as a result of cross-cultural studies (Lajunen & Özkan, 2004; Lajunen & 
Summala, 1995; Lajunen et al., 1998a; 1998b; Özkan et al., 2006b).  
1.5 Factors related to professional driving and safety 
Concerning professional drivers, professional driving and safety, it is possible to talk 
about importance of variety of factors that might be investigated from an individual 
(e.g., personality characteristics of individual drivers); organization/company (e.g., 
structure, culture), group (e.g., bus, heavy vehicle drivers), nation (e.g., economy, 
infrastructure) or environment (e.g., climate) point of view. In the present study some 
predominant individual, organization and group related factors were focused on.    
1.6 Individual related factors of professional driving and safety 
In the driving literature, many studies have been conducted to investigate the 
relationships among individual related factors. For example, driver behaviours and 
performance of both professional and non-professional drivers have been studied in 
relation to age and sex (Elander et al., 1993; Laapotti, 2003; Lajunen & Parker, 
2001); personality characteristic like sensation seeking, neuroticism, extroversion, 
type A personality (e.g., Brown, 1995; Dorn & Matthews, 1992; Horvath & 
Zuckerman, 1993; Matthews et al., 1991; West et al., 1992); attitudes and motives 
(e.g., Elander et al., 1993; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2002); cognitive processes (e.g., 
Manstead et al., 1992; Ross, 1977); exposure (e.g., Brown, 1995; Corfitsen, 1993); 
fatigue (e.g., Morrow & Crum, 2004; Williamson et al., 1996), and sleep problems 
(e.g., Howard et al., 2004; McCartt et al., 2000). Although those and many other 
factors are rather related to driver behaviours and performance, and safety, the ones 





1.6.1 Age and sex: Predominant demographic factors  
Both age and sex were indicated as being directly related to driver behaviours, 
performance and accident involvement. For example, young men drivers were tend 
to commit violations more frequently as compared to the women and older drivers, 
while female and older drivers committed more errors as compared to young and 
man drivers (Blockey & Hartley, 1995; Parker et al., 2000; Reason et al, 1990). In 
terms of driver performance, male drivers were indicated to have higher perceptual-
motor skills whereas female drivers scored higher on safety skills (Lajunen et al., 
1998a; Lajunen & Summala, 1995). The majority of the people killed in traffic 
accidents are young men (Blockey & Hartley, 1995; Evans, 1991). Although age was 
indicated as related to accident liability among both young and older drivers, it might 
be argued that accidents at different ages might be results of different factors as well. 
For instance, as the driver gets older, deficiencies in visual acuity might be observed; 
while for younger drivers risky driving might be the cause of the accidents (Owsley et 
al., 1991; Summala, 1987). Increased risk of young male drivers is more related to 
attitudes and motivational factors rather than being related to age and sex (Lajunen, 
1997). Thus, in spite of the results indicating the significant relationships among age, 
sex and hazardous driving, it is very difficult to clarify the relationship among those 
variables.     
As a result of their studies conducted with professional and non-professional French 
drivers, Charbotel et al. (2010) showed that the people injured in work-related 
accidents were older than those injured during private trips. While the ages of the 
people in the former group changed from 25 to 34, the range changed from 18 to 24 
for the people in the latter group. Regarding gender differences the results showed 
that, in the case of work related accidents, the distribution of age groups and the 
trends are similar for men and women. In another study conducted by Clarke et al. 
(2005), it was indicated that the crash-involved professional drivers were almost all 
male, and accident severity increased with age. Similarly men were found to have 
greater numbers of offenses than women (Bingham et al., 2006). Some of the 
previous studies provided evidence on the effects of sex and age on stress reactions 
of drivers as well. Male drivers reported comparatively higher aggression and 
comparatively lower overtaking tension compared to female drivers (Matthews et al., 
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1999). Simon and Corbett (1996) reported a negative relationship between age and 
measure of general stress. Similarly, Gulian et al. (1989) found that older drivers 
reported less stress. 
1.6.2 Driver Stress: A correlate of driving 
As Gulian et al. (1990) indicated driving is a task where mild stress symptoms, like 
worry and unpleasant emotions, are observed frequently. In addition to the familiar 
daily experiences of life, severe life events, like divorce, might create stress in 
driving. At this point, as Mathews (1998) indicated, studying driver stress contributes 
to the understanding of the real world stressors’ influence on cognition and 
performance; life stress; and road safety together with human factors related to road 
safety. For professional drivers, in addition to the general life stressors, job status 
and job demands have been emphasized as important stressors (see Matthews et 
al., 1999; Karasek &Theorell, 1990). This job related nature of professional driving 
highlights professional drivers as a specific and important group while studying driver 
stress. Thus, in the present study, driver stress was investigated as a predominant 
factor being related to professional driving and outcomes of it.            
Mathews (1998) mentioned about some difficulties of constructing a model of driver 
stress and performance. Such that, objective measures of performance and a 
coherent theoretical framework is needed to distinguish symptoms from underlying 
causal processes; state expressions of stress from the trait expressions; and general 
stress related factors from driving specific factors. Some of the researchers 
investigating driver stress employed transactional models of stress (e.g., Gulian, et 
al., 1989; Matthews, 2001; 2002) emphasizing cognitions, and the ecological 
relationship between person and environment. As Matthews (2002) stated, a 
transactional model differentiates different classes of constructs interacting 
dynamically. These factors include personality factors, cognitive factors, 
environmental factors; and as outcomes, subjective stress symptoms and 
performance. The model suggests that environmental (e.g., high workload) and 
personality factors (e.g., dislike of driving) determine how external factors are 
interpreted, which in turn influences cognitive stress processes. Cognitive stress 
processes support two forms of outcome: subjective outcomes (e.g., anger) and 
performance outcomes (e.g., risk-taking). Feedbacks from outcomes to environment 
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go dynamically. Most of the time, the stressors are corrected over short period of 
time if the cognitive processing is not highly biased. Matthews (2002) emphasized 
that when cognitive processing is highly biased, stress outcomes might be more 
damaging for safety.  
Gulian et al. (1989) and Glendon et al. (1993) developed the Driving Behaviour 
Inventory (DBI) by adopting a transactional approach where driver stress, and 
consequent driving performance are resulted from the interactive effects of “(i) the 
driver's assessment of the task environment (e.g. traffic density, weather); (ii) their 
assessment of their ability to cope with those conditions; and (iii) their selection of a 
behavioural strategy” (Westerman & Haigney, 2000, p. 3). In order to figure out the 
factors structure of the DBI, the data was collected from company car drivers on their 
emotional reactions to driving, and behaviour in demanding driving conditions. As a 
result, three principle dimensions of aggression, dislike of driving and alertness, and 
two minor dimensions related to overtaking: irritation when overtaken and overtaking 
affect were obtained. Studies showed that both dislike of driving – the dimension 
which is most strongly related to negative emotional reactions to driving – and 
aggression – the dimension which is related to feelings of post-drive anger – were 
related to some emotional and behavioural stress reactions (e.g., Matthews et al., 
1991; Matthews & Wells, 1996). Later, some studies using the DBI revealed different 
factor solutions. Lajunen and Summala (1995) found only three factors, namely 
aggression, dislike of driving and alertness. The other two overtaking factors loaded 
predominantly on aggression. Westerman and Haigney (2000) suggested two new 
‘situation-specific’ factors in a five-factor solution. These factors were named as 
situation-specific tension and situation-specific concentration. According to Glendon 
et al.’s (1993) studies, DBI scores were stable across a five-month period. 
Accordingly, the dimensions might be characterised as personality traits representing 
vulnerabilities to qualitatively different types of stress outcomes and linked to the 
driving context (Matthews et al., 1998). 
Matthews et al. (1997) revised the previous factor structure of the DBI with the aims 
of adding assessment of fatigue reactions and enjoyment of driving to the principal 
dimensions of the DBI, and to apply transactional framework as the sampling basis 
while assessing drivers’ stress vulnerability traits. The revised version of the DBI was 
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named as the Driver Stress Inventory which measured five dimensions of stress. In 
defining the Driver Stress Inventory scales, as different from the DBI scales, only 
appraisal and subjective stress symptom items were used. The name of the inventory 
has changed from ‘behaviour’ to ‘stress’ and it was indicated that coping and 
behavioural outcomes require separate assessment. The five scales of the Driver 
Stress Inventory were named as dislike of driving, aggression, fatigue proneness, 
hazard monitoring, and thrill-seeking. The first three dimensions of the Driver Stress 
Inventory predicted different types of subjective state disturbance during driving 
related to anxiety, anger and fatigue symptoms, respectively. Hazard monitoring 
dimension primarily reflects a coping style that aims to prevent threat by search for 
danger. Thrill-seeking is defined by items that describe enjoyment of danger 
(Matthews, 2002). Matthews et al. (1998) explained that, aggression and dislike of 
driving are related to broad cognitive-affective syndromes which are central to 
appraisal and coping styles. Alertness/hazard monitoring, thrill-seeking and fatigue 
proneness on the other hand, are somewhat narrower dimensions being related 
more clearly to coping than appraisal.  
1.7 The relationships among driver behaviours and performance, stress 
reactions and accident involvement 
Previous findings pointed that, violations predicted active loss-of-control and passive 
right-of-way accidents (Parker et al., 1995a; 1995b). Additionally violations were 
found to be related to speeding, and parking offences (Mesken et al., 2002). 
However, slips and lapses were not indicated as having impact on safety (Parker et 
al., 1995a) in spite of the association between high lapses scores and passive 
accident involvement (Parker et al., 2000). Errors and lapses, taken together, were 
found to be significant predictors of accidents as many times as the various violation 
factors (Dobson et al., 1999; Meadows et al., 1998; Özkan & Lajunen 2005; Özkan et 
al., 2006a; Parker et al., 1995a; 1995b; Sümer, 2003). The only study that did not 
find any effect was conducted by Blockey and Hartley (1995). 
Literature on the relationship between accident involvement and driver performance 
indicated that there is an asymmetric relationship between perceptual-motor and 
safety skills. Overestimation of perceptual-motor skills may predispose drivers to 
risky driver behaviours. However, by means of safety skills they become more 
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cautious and able to anticipate possible hazards on the road (Sümer et al., 2006). 
The drivers reporting low level of safety skills but a high level of perceptual-motor 
skills had the highest levels of accidents and penalties. The relationship between 
perceptual-motor skills, accidents, and penalties were negative (Lajunen et al., 
1998a). The balance between perceptual-motor skills and safety skills has been 
proposed as critical for driving safely (Lajunen et al., 1998b).    
Driver stress and driving safety relationship has been investigated previously within 
variety of researches (e.g., Evans et al., 1987; Magnavita et al., 1997). Aggression, 
thrill-seeking and to some extent low hazard monitoring were found to predict self-
reported accident involvement. Aggression, thrill-seeking, and low dislike of driving 
were reported to be related to offences such as speeding, and to higher self-reported 
violations. Higher rates of self-reported errors were associated with high aggression, 
thrill-seeking, dislike and fatigue proneness, and with low hazard monitoring (Dorn & 
Matthews, 1995). As a result of their study on the relationship among the DBI scales 
and the DBQ factors, Westerman and Haigney (2000) indicated that driver stress is 
related to both errors and violations and several facets of driver stress will have 
different impact on driver behaviours. The results of this study indicated that, high 
levels of driver stress were associated with increased self-report of the DBQ factors. 
According to Matthews et al. (1999), if the job involves vehicle driving, there is a 
possibility of work demands to influence the drivers’ general attitudes and reactions 
toward driving. Similarly, Karasek and Theorell (1990) asserted that job status and 
work demands may influence stress outcomes interactively in such a way that people 
may perceive the high workloads as less aversive if they have some control over 
work activities. They also emphasized the role of driver stress as a factor increasing 
the likelihood of accident involvement and its cost for companies. Gulian et al. (1989) 
found correlations between dislike of driving and reports of work stressors, like 







1.8 Organization related factors of professional driving and safety 
Organizations are complex systems having values, principles, attitudes and 
viewpoints making them different from others (Arnold, 1998). The previous literature 
shows that behaviours and job performance might be influenced from different 
organization related factors (e.g., Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2010; Rundmo & 
Iversen, 2007). In addition to being complex, organizations are also dynamic and 
multi-faceted human systems operating in dynamic environments. Conditions or 
situations at one time and one place cannot be generalized into a constant truth 
(Dawson, 1996). Accordingly, it could be assumed that in an organization there might 
be different factors affecting some aspects of professional driving, which is a task on 
which the professional drivers are expected to show their performance within work 
related context, i.e., in traffic settings. These factors might be collected under three 
main categories as structure (i.e., the formal organization); culture (i.e., basic 
assumptions); and the process (i.e., the primary processes exist in the organization). 
The behaviour is determined as a result of the interaction of these factors 
(Guldenmund, 2010).        
Although before 1980s more structural/technical aspects of the organizations were 
emphasized as being related to performance and safety issues; especially after big 
organizational accidents a shift from the technical aspects of work environments to 
human factor related aspects has been observed (Gravan & O’Brein, 2001). 
Occupational safety has gained significant importance and the tendency to seek the 
causes of accidents by considering the interaction between technology and 
organizational factors/failures has increased considerably (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 
2000). After the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986, accident investigations have 
started to be made by taking organizational culture as a base and poor safety culture 
was indicated as a contributory factor for the accident (see Pidgeon, 1998; Cox & 
Flin, 1998; Weick, 1987). 
1.8.1 Organizational culture and climate  
Hofstede (2001) indicated that if national culture defines the collective mental 
programming of the mind distinguishing the people of one nation from another; 
organizational culture might mean the collective mental programming of the mind 
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distinguishing the members of one organization from another. Moreover, Hofstede 
distinguished organizational cultures from national cultures and mentioned about 
these two concepts as complementary. He emphasized that as representing two 
different levels of aggregation, organizational cultures distinguish organizations while 
holding the national culture constant, whereas national cultures distinguish nations by 
holding organizational cultures constant, at least as much as possible. Antonsen 
(2009) indicated that anthropological definitions of culture might be applied to 
national culture not to the organizational culture as the primary socialization of 
organizational members does not take place within the borders of organization as a 
cultural unit. That is, the roots of organizational culture are not as deep as that of 
national culture. Although the concepts of organizational culture and climate has 
been studied so far since 1970s, it is very difficult to say that there has been a 
consensus on the definitions of and differences between these two concepts, as well 
as the models to develop to understand and explore their relationships with other 
variables (e.g., Glick, 1985; Guldenmund, 2000; Schein, 1992; James et al., 2008).  
1.8.1.1 Definitions and characteristics of organizational culture and climate 
As Guldenmund (2010) indicated, different definitions of organizational culture and 
climate have been proposed in the literature for the purpose of focusing the research. 
Example definitions of culture and climate are listed below: 
 
Organizational Culture  
• According to Schein (1992) organizational culture is “a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 12). 
Organizational Climate  
• Zohar (1980) defined organizational climate as “a summary of molar 
perceptions that employees share about their work environments” (p. 96). 
Those perceptions are thought to have a psychological utility in serving as a 
frame of reference for guiding appropriate and adaptive task behaviours. 
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As the definitions imply and the literature indicates, culture and climate concepts 
have some differences besides the similarities between them. Guldenmund (2000; 
2010) investigated the characteristics of culture and climate concepts in detail and 
discussed the methodological differences between these two concepts. Accordingly it 
was indicated that culture research is based mainly on qualitative methods (e.g., field 
notes, quotes), whereas climate research is conducted mostly by using quantitative 
methods (e.g., questionnaires) that share a lot of similarities with attitude 
measurements. According to Denison (1996) culture research aims at achieving a 
deep understanding of the underlying mechanisms whereas climate research deals 
with organizational members’ perception of organizational practices and how these 
practices and perceptions are categorized into the analytical dimensions defined by 
the researchers (see Guldenmund, 2000 for more detailed expression of the 
characteristics of culture and climate concepts). In culture research, understanding is 
important whereas in climate research emphasize is on change or improvement 
(Guldenmund, 2010). Hofstede (1998) indicated that climate is more related to 
individuals’ motivation and behaviour, whereas culture is entirely placed at the 
organizational level. In a similar vein James et al. (2008) stated that organizational 
climate is a property of individual whereas culture is a property of organization. While 
culture research specifies the deep psychological attributes, like values, emphasizes 
the socialization process of culture and development and etiology of culture over time 
depending on this socialization process; climate research deals with more identifiable 
organizational features, like safety and service by using measurement and 
documentation advantage of it (Ashkanasy et al., 2000). 
1.8.1.2 Conceptualization of organizational culture and climate 
Operationalisation of culture and climate is pretty important because the relationship 
with other variables/concepts might differ depending on the way these concepts are 
operationally defined (Guldenmund, 2010). Culture and climate researches are not 
parallel to each other; the study of climate preceded that of culture (Ashkanasy et al., 
2000). The roots of climate research go back to the Field Theory of Kurt Lewin and 
his colleagues. Lewin et al. (1939) mentioned about the concept of climate in social 
psychology to indicate the psychological conditions created by the leaders of boys’ 
groups. This study of Lewin and his colleagues was grounded in Gestalt psychology 
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and aimed to investigate the interaction patterns between the individual in the 
field/environment. According to the critical notion of the whole of Gestalt psychology, 
individuals reform the individual elements of perception into wholes representing 
more than a simple sum of the individual pieces. Based on this logic, climate, or 
atmosphere, is constituted by the sense that people make of their patterns of 
experience and behaviours or other parties within the same situation. At a later time 
McGregor represented the concept of organizational climate with an emphasis to 
‘managerial climate’ in 1960, when the assessment of organizational climate has 
started to be made via the development of questionnaires. However, the issue of 
aggregation has been a topic of discussion in the climate research as a result of 
analysis of individual level data at organizational level.  
The term organizational climate was a broad construct studied by the researchers. 
However, it has successively been restricted to attitudinal or psychological 
phenomena within the organizational context. Jones and James (1979) underlined 
the tendency to stress the descriptive and cognitive nature of climate to divorce it 
from the affective and evaluative aspects of job-related attitudes. It might be possible 
to find conceptual distinctions between perceptual/cognitive representations of a 
situation and evaluative/affective reactions to that situation. Nevertheless, it should 
be considered that concept formation and attitude formation processes have parallels 
that might result in close and dynamic relationships to each other which are quite 
difficult to distinguish (James & Jones, 1974; Jones & James, 1979; Schneider, 
1975).  
As indicated by Ashkanasy et al. (2000) in the late 1970s the concept of 
organizational culture has emerged as an alternative way to make the same 
conceptualization of Gestalt of organizations for their members emerged. The 
concept of climate was replaced by culture. Since the emergence of it, the term of 
organizational culture dominated the research literature with the comprehensive 
meaning covered by the term climate in the beginning. However, domination of the 
concept of culture did not solve the problem of ambiguity; it was not free from 
problem. As Martin (1992) indicated the problem of culture might ‘being almost 
anything and as a result being everything’ depending on the researcher conducting 
the research.  
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The fact that the distinction between culture and climate concepts should be resolved 
has been taken the attention of plenty of researchers so far, however many authors 
fail to discriminate these two concepts. Some researchers preferred to use these two 
terms interchangeably (e.g., Parker, et al., 2006; Katz and Kahn, 1978); while others 
indicated that they are two separate concepts (Ott, 1989; Yule, 2003); while some 
others indicated that they are not (e.g., Ashkansy, et al., 2000; Antonsen, 2009; 
Denison, 1996). Some other researchers even did not prefer to mention about the 
concept of climate in their models/studies (e.g. Martin, 1992; Schein, 1992). As a 
result it seems that even the studies up to the recent times have difficulties in 
displaying precise borders on the definition and contents of these two concepts (see, 
Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2010). One reason for not ending up with clear 
definitions and conceptualizations of culture and climate concepts might be related to 
the studies conducted on organizational climate. That is, a decade ago it has been 
indicated that, there has been virtually no research to investigate the development of 
climate in organizations or to understand the nature of this concept, which should be 
the main focus (Ashkanasy et al., 2000).   
Organizational culture is a concept having multiple levels (Schein, 1992; Hofstede, 
1991). Hofstede (1998) suggested that in the way the cross-national studies 
determine national culture dimensions, the cross-organizational studies determine 
organizational culture dimensions. As a result of his study investigating 1295 
individual employees’ responses as aggregated into mean scores for twenty 
organizational units, it was indicated that organizational culture could be described 
with six dimensions: process oriented versus results oriented, employee oriented 
versus job oriented, parochial versus professional, open versus closed, loose versus 
tight, and normative versus pragmatic (see Hofstede, 1998).  
Schein’s (1992) classification of organizational culture includes three levels: 
artefacts, espoused values and basic assumptions. In order to understand the core of 
the culture the data collected from its periphery is used. The core is the nature of the 
culture and it is not possible to directly measure it. According to Schein (1992) it is 
the basic assumptions operating in an organization, the other two layers of artefacts 
and espoused values are the manifestations of culture. Artefacts are easy to read but 
not to understand in terms of culture. They alone do not provide any insight in to the 
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motivation or thought process underlying them. Their relation to the underlying 
culture is not easy to understand. They might be accepted as raw material to 
understand basic assumptions and culture as a whole and be combined with other 
artefacts and espoused values to that end. Behaviour might be a part of the core of 
the culture; it might be an expression of basic assumptions however might be an 
expression of some external conditions like weather, or internal conditions like 
psychological states. According to Schein (1992) organizational climate is nothing 
more than what he calls artefacts, or manifestations and reflections of cultural 
assumptions.         
Ashkanasy et al. (2000) argued that culture and climate should not be investigated as 
two distinct concepts. Climate is individually perceived and experienced as different 
from culture; however culture cannot have effects without individuals seeing it. This 
‘link’ between them shows that these two concepts are connected to each other 
although some researchers disregarded this connection. Both organizational climate 
and organizational culture are related to the creation and influence of social context 
in organizations (Denison, 1996). Thus, when one talks about climate change, it is 
not a process that is unrelated to culture. That is, if the desired climate is not 
congruent with the underlying assumptions, it is not possible to make the desired 
change. For example, if the underlying assumptions in an organization are ‘individual 
and comparative’, climate of ‘teamwork and cooperation’ cannot be created. 
In his review paper Schneider (1975) indicated organizational climate as an 
amorphous and inclusive concept having amorphous measurements, as a result. As 
climate concept has many potential faces causing not to have a specific focus, 
climate research has to focus on something. In other words, climate for something 
should be emphasized in climate research. Concordantly, Zohar (1980) indicated that 
within a single organization different climates are created. In other words, the term 
organizational climate should be added an appropriate adjective indicating the type of 
the climate like ‘motivation climate’ (Litwin & Stringer, 1968); ‘safety climate’ (Zohar, 
1980); and ‘creativity climate’ (Taylor, 1972) so that the term describes a specific 
area of research, as well as becoming more narrow and tangible (Guldenmund, 




1.8.1.3 Safety culture and climate as aspects of organizational culture 
The concept of safety 
As an aspect of organizational culture, safety culture and climate might provide a 
transition from organizational culture to safety. Before mentioning about where safety 
culture and climate stands within the organization, it might be important to 
understand the concept of ‘safety’. As Antonsen (2009) emphasized, safety has to do 
with minimizing the risk by reducing the occurrence probability of dangerous event; or 
by reducing the consequences of that event, if it happens. Danger is a true reality; 
risk, on the other hand, is the evaluations of dangers (Douglas, 1992). Definition of 
safety consists of three elements: a relation to a state or situation, where statistical 
risk can be mentioned about; feeling of security or control; and lastly includes 
practice (i.e., work performance or organizational, technological, physical barriers) by 
which the probability of dangerous event change (Antonsen, 2009). 
In the process of studying safety within organizations, engineering perspective put 
emphasis on safety systems or management whereas the studies relied on the 
psychological perspective has stressed attitudes and behaviours in relation to safety 
(Pidgeon, 1998). According to Hale and Hoven (1998), organizational safety has 
developed through three ‘ages of safety’: technical age (e.g., safer machines and 
equipment), human factor age (e.g., strategic recruitment, upgrading employee’s 
skills increasing employee motivation), and management systems age (e.g., 
organizational conditions for safety, management systems). In a recent research, 
Hudson (2007) mentioned about three waves: technical wave, system wave and 
culture wave. Both point of views indicated that these stages are sequential. Glendon 
et al. (2006) on the other hand, stressed that the period of development should be on 
the way that the latter builds on the former, not leaves it behind. This point of view 
has been indicated as the age of integration where more complex and multiple 
perspectives build on the still available previous ways of thinking. Borys et al. (2009) 
claimed that a new age must be mentioned by the name of adaptation age where all 
other ages are transcended without being discounted, it is beyond integrating the 
past. In a most recent organization of ages of safety, Özkan and Lajunen (2011) 
focused on a broader perspective including organizational factors as well. According 
to their point of view, ‘safety culture period’ is the fourth age of safety where person 
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(i.e., the role of human factors in traffic accidents) and environment (i.e., the structure 
of the complex multilevel socio-cultural and technical environment of the traffic with 
its goals and mechanisms) are merged.          
Characteristics and definitions 
The discussion on the main characteristics and differences between organizational 
culture and climate mentioned in the previous sections might be applied for safety 
culture and climate concepts as well (see Wiegmann et al., 2004; Rundmo, 2000; 
Glendon & Litherland, 2001). For example, safety culture was stated to be more 
enduring whereas safety climate is a temporary state of an organization and being 
affected from the specific changes and characteristic of the organization (e.g., 
Wiegmann et al., 2004). These two concepts were indicated as complementary or 
operating at different levels besides being independent, or as two different 
approaches to the goal of determining the importance of safety within an organization 
(Guldenmund, 2010). According to some point of views, safety climate is not a 
concept to study as separated from safety culture. For some researchers they are so 
close to each other that, safety culture researches carried on solely by using 
questionnaires are called safety climate researches (see Guldenmund, 2007).  
As it was in the case of organizational culture and climate, there have been plenty of 
definitions of safety culture and climate as well. Researchers studied on the 
definitions of these terms and tried to end up with differentiations on them. For 
example, after investigating a plenty of safety culture definition, Choudhry et al. 
(2007) indicated that most of the definitions mention about the beliefs, and each 
mentions about the way people think and/or behave in relation to safety. 
Nevertheless, the concepts of safety culture and safety climate are not clearly 
defined; their relationships to each other, cause, content and consequences are not 
clearly pointed out either (Guldenmund, 2010). The example definitions presented 
below might be seen to realize that how difficult it is to make the differentiation 






Safety Culture is: 
• “The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, 
and the style and proficiency of and organization’s health and safety 
management” (ACSNI, 1993, p. 23). 
Safety Climate is: 
• The objective measurement of attitudes and perceptions toward occupational 
health and safety issues (Coyle et al., 1995). 
 
Multidimensionality of safety culture and climate 
Since the beginning of safety climate research there have been many studies to 
investigate the dimensional structure of this concept (Parker et al., 2006; 
Guldenmund, 2010). Being the first researcher studying the concept of safety 
climate, Zohar (1980) conducted a literature review and demonstrated the following 
dimensions that safety climate has: ‘perceived management attitudes towards safety, 
perceived effects of safe conduct on promotion, perceived effects of safe conduct on 
social status, perceived organizational status of safety officer, perceived importance 
and effectiveness of safety training, perceived risk level at work place, and perceived 
effectiveness of enforcement versus guidance in promoting safety’ (p. 3). Since then, 
many studies have been conducted to determine the factor structure of safety culture 
and climate. At first glance the resulted dimensionality differed in terms of the 
dimensions and the number of the dimensions. Additionally, the attempts to end up 
with the same factor structure as a result of the studies conducted in similar kind of 
organizations were not successful (Coyle et al., 1995). Guldenmund (2010) indicated 
that this might be a result of conducting the researches in different sectors. 
Employees from different sectors might have different objects for their attitudes, for 
this reason different dimensions resulted from the studies conducted in different 
sectors like construction, energy and service are not much similar in terms of their 
content (see Cox & Cox, 1991; Coyle et al., 1995; Cabrera et al., 1997). Even the 
results of the studies conducted in similar companies were not able to replicate the 
previously found factor structures (Collins & Gadd, 2002; Guldenmund, 2000). 
Although the researches ended up with different factor solutions, there are some 
common factors appeared in most of the studies. The factor related to ‘management’, 
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for example, is the most replicated factor. Flin et al. (2000) mentioned about five 
broad common safety culture dimensions: management (i.e., management’s 
commitment to safety), safety system (i.e., safety policies, safety equipment), risk 
(i.e., risk-taking behaviour, perceptions of worksite hazards), work pressure (i.e., 
work pace, workload), and competence (i.e., selection and training of the work force, 
assessment of worker competence).     
Causal models on organizational safety culture and climate 
There are different arguments about the time when the first safety culture and climate 
researches have been conducted. According to Guldenmund (2010) it goes back to 
1951 when Keenan et al.’s introspective ratings of employees in an automotive plant 
were gathered. However, the concept of safety climate has been first introduced to 
the literature by Zohar (1980). Since then, it has been the subject of many 
researches (e.g., Guldenmund, 2010; Probst et al., 2008; Varonen & Mattila, 2000). 
A major shortcoming with most of safety culture models is the lack of their integration 
into general models of organizational culture (Choudhry et al., 2007). Guldenmund 
(2000) indicated that the causal models developed to understand the concept of 
safety climate in relation to the organizational variables do not focus on a causal 
chain, instead mention about some tentative relationships. Although there have been 
many developed models of safety culture and climate; it is very hard to say that these 
are satisfactory to understand these concepts. These facts uncover the need of 
overall satisfying model of organizational culture/climate. 
The first actual model of safety climate functioning was developed by Glennon (1982) 
who operationalised safety climate as the perception of organizational reality. The 
model demonstrated the cause, content and consequences of safety climate in a 
very global way. The measurement mentioned within this model is partly a kind of 
attitude measurement. According to the model, there is a sequence of processes 
from organizational characteristics (e.g., structure, hazards, strategy) to 
organizational outcomes (e.g., services, accidents). In this model, organizational 
climate is in a direct relationship with behaviour or individual outcomes, has an 
indirect relationship with organizational outcomes.   
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In the model proposed by Guldenmund (2010) safety culture and climate were ‘fused’ 
as he described. This model was theoretically based on Schein’s (1992) dimensions 
of culture. The model included three levels: basic assumptions (unconscious and 
relatively unspecific) at the base level; espoused values at the middle level including 
attitudes having specific objects (four objects were mentioned about for safety 
culture: hardware, software, people and behaviour). The last level which is the 
closest to the surface is artefacts (manifestations specific to an object). Accidents or 
incidents, various behaviours, and inspections might be some examples of 
manifestations. The researcher quoted his model as being loyal to the holistic 
structure of organizational culture by fusing culture and climate. He also suggested 
that different levels of the model might be studied separately. Accordingly, if safety is 
the studied concept, for example, basic assumptions do not have to be safety 
related. However, if safety is handled very seriously in an organization it might be 
possible to argue that some assumptions within that particular organization might 
provide a base or reference to safety. 
After a variety of discussions and arguments on culture and climate concepts in 
organizational settings, the models like the one Guldenmund (2010) proposed would 
provide the researchers with a more precise understanding of the relationships 
between these concepts, as well as defining the way how they are placed in the 
complete system of safety. In their chapter, Özkan and Lajunen (2011) modelled 
traffic safety from a comprehensive and multi-level point of view. Culture and climate 
were indicated as two different but mutually inclusive concepts. Climate indicated to 
be the surface features of safety culture, or temporal state measure of it. In this 
model, accordingly, culture and climate has been proposed as two layers of culture 
that could operate consistently and harmoniously to minimize the exposure of people 
to dangers at each level of traffic culture (i.e., individual, organizational, group, 
national and socio-political). Both within and between layer and level interactions of 
active and latent conditions/failures are important for safety.    
The present study does not aim to cover all the characteristics of a culture research, 
according to the most definitions of it. That is, more observable, behavioural aspects 
of organizational culture were studied. Although culture, as a more embracing 
concept, provides a frame of reference for the observable aspects with its basic 
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assumptions (see Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2010; Özkan & Lajunen, 
2011), the detailed analyses of basic assumptions with multilevel way of data 
collection and analyses were not conducted in the present study. Thus, it is more 
feasible to call the present study as a climate study. As the literature indicated, 
climate studies should focus on “something (e.g., Zohar, 1980). For the present 
study, the climate for “safety” is studied basically. 
1.9 Organizational safety culture/climate in relation to safe driving 
As societies do, organizations have different cultures (Schein, 1992). In the case of 
organizational culture, the emphasis is on better or worse cultures, stronger or 
weaker cultures, and the ‘right’ kind of culture to end up with effective organizations 
(Schein, 1992). Strength of climate, which is the amount of agreement among 
employees, was emphasized as being related to some important organizational 
outcomes (Dickson et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2002). Hofstede’s (1998) six 
organizational culture dimensions showed that besides being influenced by 
employees’ feelings and behaviours, organizational culture practices directly 
influence both behaviours and feelings. This was supported by some previous 
studies indicating that organizational culture is related to certain employee-related 
variables like satisfaction (Lund, 2003), and commitment (Sheridan, 1992), and to 
organizational performance (e.g., Ogbonna & Harris, 2000). Similarly, Steinwachs 
(1999) indicated that shared values in a group make people think and act similarly 
and, therefore, the culture of a group implies the behaviours of the people of that 
group. According to Wiegmann et al. (2004) in the organizations with a well 
established safety culture; beliefs, attitudes, and practices should emphasize 
minimizing the exposure of employees to hazards. In other words, any type of 
application including training, selection, work schedules, and use of equipment 
should be organized by taking employees’ safety into account.  
Several studies have shown that safety performance has been affected by safety 
climate (e.g., Clarke, 2006; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Neal & Griffin, 2006), although 
this relationship has been indicated as weak by a number of researchers (e.g., 
Ashkanasy, 2000; Clarke, 2006; Guldenmund, 2010). Ostrom et al. (1993) stated that 
organization’s socially transmitted beliefs and attitudes toward safety affect safety 
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performance. According to Neal et al. (2000), safety culture mediates the relationship 
between organizational culture and safety performance. Rundmo (2000) indicated 
acceptance of rule violation as a strong predictor of risky behaviour and showed that 
perceived management priority of safety over production is a significant predictor of 
non-acceptability of rule violations. Similar to this, Varonen and Mattila (2000) found 
that company’s positive attitudes to safety and its safety precautions are negatively 
related to accident rate. Spencer-Oatey (2000) mentioned about the existence of the 
relationship between safety culture and accidents and added that this relationship is 
determinative, rather than being interpretative.  
In a more recent study Christian et al. (2009) stated that positive safety climate 
enhance safety knowledge through on-the-job discussions and formal trainings. 
Safety climate positively influences safety performance behaviours through safety 
knowledge and motivation, and negatively influence safety outcomes. The results of 
their meta-analytic study revealed that both person and situation are important 
workplace safety related factors in such a way that if the workers are selected trained 
and supported to maximize safety motivation and safety knowledge, an increase in 
safe behaviours and decrease in frequency of accidents and injuries are observed. 
Depending on the studies mentioned above, it might be argued that safety culture 
and climate is a concept worth of studying in relation to professional driving and 
safety. 
1.10 Group related factors of professional driving and safety: Different driver 
groups  
Traffic settings include a great deal of drivers from different driver groups ‘acting’ on 
the roads at the same time. Those driver groups might be divided into two as non-
professional drivers and professional drivers (e.g., bus, heavy vehicle, minibus, taxi, 
emergency car drivers). Although all driver groups obey the general traffic rules 
which are valid for any driver, some driver groups have some informal rules to follow 
as a result of which they might develop different driving styles and have different 
accident risks (Sümer & Özkan, 2002).      
Some characteristics of specific driver groups might make them more prone to 
different type of dangers or had different characteristics. As an example, four-wheel 
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drivers committed more violations, errors and lapses as compared to car users 
(Bener et al., 2008). Emergency vehicles were most likely to be involved in crashes 
because of excessive speed, with taxis this situation was the least likely one (Clarke 
et al., 2005). Fleet cars and fleet commercial vehicles were relatively less likely to 
speed as compared to their non-fleet counterparts. Lorry drivers had a higher 
proportion of crashes resulted from close following and fatigue/illness. Taxi drivers 
were the only group showing over-involvement in crashes caused by deliberate 
recklessness or failure to correctly judge gaps in traffic before making a manoeuvre. 
Company car drivers on the other hand had more accidents on slippery roads, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, or while speeding, as compared with other 
professional driver groups. Bus drivers showed a higher proportion of close following 
and failure to precede crashes (Clarke et al., 2005). In their study, Charbotel et al. 
(2010) indicated that the increased severity of accidents among heavy vehicle drivers 
means that this group accounts for a higher percentage of drivers killed while at 
work.  
Studies in general investigated the non-professional drivers or a specific driver 
groups, like taxi drivers (Rosenbloom & Shahar, 2007). Comparison of different driver 
groups in terms of their driving related characteristics has been a mostly untouched 
topic. However, according to the previous studies conducted on professional drivers 
it might be argued that such comparisons are needed to understand the nature and 
characteristics of driving for different driver groups. 
1.11 Methodological considerations: Measuring driving, accidents and safety 
culture/climate  
Socially desirable responding   
The studies conducted with self-reports indicated that this way of data collection 
might result in inaccurate or biased data to some degree because of socially 
desirable responding. That is, participants might tend to give responses that make 
them look good. This might be in the form of ‘impression management’ or ‘self-
deception’ (Paulhus, 1984; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Impression management, being a 
situation related phenomenon, is close to lying and falsification, and in self-reports of 
traffic behaviour it might cause serious biases (Lajunen, 1997; Paulhus, 1984). Self 
deception on the other hand, is a factor that can be characterised as a positively 
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biased but subjectively honest self-description. This construct is not influenced by 
anonymity versus public context manipulation (Paulhus, 1984).    
According to Lajunen and Summala (2003) the bias caused by socially desirable 
responding is very small in the DBQ responses when the respondents complete the 
questionnaires anonymously and cannot gain anything by giving embellished 
responses. Socially desirable answers could be observed in the report of accidents 
as well. It was indicated that a problem with the accident data might be forgetting or 
deliberate under reporting of accidents (Elander et al., 1993; Lajunen, 1997; Zohar, 
2000). However, Lajunen et al. (1998b) reported that an individual’s need for social 
approval and avoidance of social disapproval influences self reports of driving; and 
impression management should always be controlled for when investigating driving 
style by self-reports.  
For the perceptual-motor skills high positive correlation was found with self-
deception, but not with impression management. Accordingly it might be argued that 
as a measure of a person’s perception of his/her perceptual-motor skill orientation, 
perceptual-motor skills of the DSI is prone to biases, such that the drivers with high 
trust of their vehicle handling skills actually over-rate their perceptual motor skills. 
That is a person may over-trust his/her motor skills and misinterpret the negative 
feed-back in driving. This may cause the drivers to have serious problems especially 
when the actual skills are insufficient. As a result, the literature shows that 
besides/apart from collecting self-report data some other ways of data gathering like 
checking the company records and archives might reveal objective, additional and 
various information on the variables of interest.  
Accident frequency as a criterion for safety  
Driver accident history has been used as a criterion for safety in plenty of studies 
concerning on-the-road individual differences of drivers. Using this kind of a criterion 
might have problems as well as advantageous of it. For example, accident history, as 
a correlate of driving has been collected via self-reports or from police statistics. The 
advantage of using self-report might be collecting minor accidents and getting more 
detailed information which may not be achieved by some other ways of data 
collection, like police statistics. However, comparison of self-report and statistics data 
have shown under-reporting of accidents. In addition police statistics are not free of 
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problems. Some accidents might not be included in the statistics if there are no injury 
or if they are minor accidents. Specific groups might be over represented, like older 
drivers, as a result of the characteristics which are not related to the risk of being 
involved in accidents (Elander et al., 1993; Evans, 1991). As Wahlberg et al. (2011) 
indicated state records typically have lower means as compared to self-reported 
accident data for the same drivers, over short time periods. It has been proposed that 
any comparison of predictive power between self-report and records data is therefore 
automatically confounded by this difference.  
Some other variables were introduced as alternative criterion measures of road 
safety. For example, Brow (1990) argued that identifying the causes of error would 
be better than focusing on trying to predict past accidents, or assessment of error 
contributions to accident statistics. However, as the theoretical models have failed to 
provide such measures and because of the uncertainty of interpreting these 
measures without connecting them to safety, these measures have not been widely 
used in the research. Although the information obtained from accidents is important, 
it does not directly address the events and behaviours that might precede and/or 
contribute those accidents. Ticketable traffic offences (i.e., penalties) constitute a 
great deal of these events and behaviours (Bingham et al., 2006). Although all traffic 
offences are not recorded, the recorded offences might represent one of the most 
reliable crash risk indicators. This fact makes offences an excellent proxy measure of 
accident risk (Elliot et al., 2001; Rajalin, 1994). Although at the present time, as a 
simpler and self-evident criterion for safety, accident rate has still been used as the 
most popular criterion. Offences/penalties might also be included into the relevant 
research at least as an additional criterion.        
Exposure as a demographic variable related to driving and safety  
There have been a wide range of studies investigating the relationship between 
exposure, the degree to which a driver is exposed to the traffic situation and accident 
involvement (e.g., French et al., 1993; Holló et al., 2010). According to Maycock et al. 
(1991) exposure and accident involvement relationship is not a linear one, but a 
negatively accelerating curve with smaller increase in accident rate at higher level of 
mileage. Additionally, being related to many factors associated to driving, exposure 
has shown differences in terms of age and gender. For different age and gender 
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groups different results regarding the relationships between exposure and driving 
related variables might be observed (Blanchard et al., 2010; Huebner et al., 2006). 
Such that male drivers have higher mileage than female drivers on average 
(Stradling & Parker, 1996). In addition to its relationship with accident involvement, 
exposure has more complicated relationships on driving style and safety (Lajunen, 
1997). For instance, being more exposed to driving had positive relationship with 
confidence in driver’s own abilities; whereas had negative relationship with safety 
related concerns (Lajunen & Summala, 1995). In addition, greater exposure was 
positively related to offenses (Bingham et al., 2006).    
As Lajunen (1997) indicated, effects of exposure on driving style and accidents 
depend on variety of factors like, type of roads driven (e.g., highway, in-city roads), 
time of the year and day (e.g., winter, holidays), purpose of driving (e.g. professional 
or non-professional driving). Although the studies resulted in mixed results in terms of 
relationship between exposure and the mentioned variety of factors; exposure, with 
its quality and quantity, should be taken into account for the accident involvement 
possibility. Ignoring the possible effects of such a variable might result in error 
variance reducing the true association between psychological variables and accident 
frequency (Elander et al., 1993; Laapotti, 2003; Maycock et al., 1991). 
Tools/techniques used in safety culture and climate research 
Using qualitative and/or quantitative data collection tools has been a big topic of 
discussion in the culture and climate research. Even the answers to the question of 
why culture research dominated previously emerging climate research might be 
related to the methodology of the climate research. As Schneider (1975) 
emphasized, based on more observable aspects and surveys as tools, climate 
research has missed the deeper psychology of organizations. Use of self-report 
survey results in culture and climate research had some problems according to 
researchers (Guldenmund, 2007). When the questionnaire results were compared 
with the data from other sources revealed mixed results (e.g., Clarke; 2006; Johnson, 
2007). At the end it might be told that for safety climate study questionnaire results 
should be used together with other sources of data, and should not be used to end 
up with the final decision. In the same vein Glendon and Stanton (2000) mentioned 
about a triangulated methodology that would be used with safety culture 
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measurements. This method provides a multi-level analysis of safety culture with the 
application of techniques like interviews, surveys, audits and document analysis, etc. 
Level of measurement and aggregation issues in safety culture and climate research 
Another important methodological consideration is the level of measurement. In the 
early climate researches, a group level conceptualization has been taken although 
the concept was studied at individual level. It is possible to talk about three levels at 
which the scales could be classified. Individual level contains perceptual processes 
influencing behaviour at individual level and behavioural processes specific to the 
individuals. Culture research context does not give so much meaning to individual 
level variables. The second level is group level; where group level behaviours and 
processes are dealt with. The last and most broad level is organization level. At this 
level behavioural process taking place at the level of management, or team is dealt 
with. Level of theory means at which level generalization will be made, and it 
determines the level of measurement. However it is important to stress that the level 
of theory and level of measurement are different things. Climate is at a group or 
organizational level of theory for this reason the questions should address the issues 
at that levels (Guldenmund, 2010).         
Raudenbush and Byrk (2002) indicated that one of the most common conceptual and 
technical difficulties in organizational research is aggregation bias. That bias can 
occur when a variable has different meanings and consequently different effects at 
different organizational levels. As James (1982) stressed, variables defined at the 
group or organizational level usually do not work well at individual level. The solution 
to this problem might be the use of multilevel modelling (Nezlek, 2008). However, as 
Guldenmund (2010) indicated, aggregating individual level data to organizational 
level does not guarantee that one would get information about attitude object existing 
at that level of aggregation. 
1.12 Framework of the present study 
The traffic system in a country organizes mobility by taking safety into account and 
minimizing the risk. Although the main goal in traffic is to maximize mobility and 
safety at the same time; for all drivers those two aspects might be in conflict in traffic 
settings (Elvik & Vaa, 2005; Evans, 2004; Hirsch, 2003). As proposed by Özkan and 
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Lajunen (2011), traffic safety culture/climate of the whole country might influence 
driving and safety of both professional and non-professional drivers who constitute a 
sample of road users of that particular country. In spite of the number of studies on 
self-reported attitudes and behaviours that influence accident risk for non-
professional drivers, relatively little research has examined the self-reported driver 
behaviours of those who drive company sponsored vehicles and/or spend long 
periods of time behind the wheel (Davey et al., 2007; Sullman et al., 2002; Xie & 
Parker, 2002). Because of the nature of their task, for the professional drivers the 
conflict between mobility and safety might have a different nature with the effects of 
some additional factors. For the professional drivers, as different from the non-
professional ones, safe driving is a situation that might be provided or shaped by the 
organization, at least partly (Caird & Klein, 2004). For the employees working for an 
organization there is a ‘system of organization’ as well, where different 
structured/unstructured or formal/informal organizational characteristics and aspects 
might play roles and have effects on its employees. However, the role of 
organizational culture and climate in professional driving and safety, by considering 
their relationship with other driving related factors as well, remained mainly 
unexamined. 
The framework of multi-level socio-cultural and technical environment of traffic 
proposed by Özkan and Lajunen (2011) pictures how factors from different levels of 
the general system might play role in driving and safety on roads. According to this 
framework, there are environment related (eco-cultural-socio-political, national, 
group, organizational, and individual) and person related factors (human factors, 
roads, engineering) concerning traffic settings. The level of safety is mostly 
determined by the way and the degree that these factors influence each other directly 
or indirectly, which in turn affect exposure and accident risk. The environment related 
factors at different levels are not equally associated with the person related factors. 
For example, the effects of geography or climate, as relatively more constant 
variables, might be more direct on engineering as compared to their effects on 
human factors. Also, within and between level interactions among the variables are 
possible. For example, it was proposed that culture of an organization will be largely 
determined by external factors or conditions like, national and regional factors; and 
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by the educational, social, economical and religious background of the employees 
(Schein, 1992; Guldenmund, 2010). Being in a different driver group (e.g., 
professional/non-professional or taxi, bus, heavy vehicle driver) might result in 
following informal rules of own group apart from or in addition to the general rules of 
traffic (Sümer & Özkan, 2002). Additionally, for the professional drivers, 
organizational factors, like culture/climate, might be more important than the formal 
traffic rules from time to time or situation to situation. As a result of the relationships 
among different variables at different levels, variances in driver behaviours and 
accident risks might be observed.    
                Background variables      Driver variables                   Outcome                  variable 







Figure 1. General framework for the relationships among environment related factors (group, organization,  driver 
stress), human factors and accidents (adapted from Özkan, 2006) 
Figure 1 shows the framework of the present study. According to this framework, 
driver groups, organizational safety climate and driver stress as group, organization 
and individual level background/environmental factors, are in relation to the human 
factors of driver behaviours and performance, and with outcome variable of accident. 
This framework implies that within level factors (safety climate, driver groups and 
driver stress; driver behaviours and performance) are also in relation to each other. It 
is assumed in the present study that, with its comprehensive point of view, grounding 
on such a framework to investigate the nature and direction of the relationships 
among the variables of interest is appropriate.   
Guldenmund (2010) argued that culture cannot be understood only from certain 
behaviours, practices or characteristics; expressions like behaviours are only partly 
determined by culture, and partly by the circumstances. However, culture provides a 
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frame of reference for these practices. While investigating professional drivers the 
present study has emphasized the organizational approach via a cultural frame of 
reference. That is, by putting emphasize on organizational safety climate the present 
study investigated professional driving and safety. In addition to safety climate, driver 
groups (both professional driver groups and non-professional drivers) and driver 
stress have been included in the framework as an environment related factor and 
being in relation to the other variables of interest.  
In summary, the framework mentioned in the present study might provide insight to 
the relationships among environment related factors, human factors and outcomes 
regarding professional driving from an organizational point of view and by 
considering the group related factors (i.e., different driver groups). Understanding the 
nature of such relationships has been indicated as a need in the previous literature 
as well. Such that, both understanding the relationship between work related factors, 
human factors and outcomes (e.g., Haworth et al., 2000); and investigation and 
comparison of different driver groups in terms of on-the-road characteristics, 
performance and safety (e.g., Rosenbloom & Shahar, 2007) have been emphasized 
as crucial in the literature.                  
1.13 Aims of the present study 
In general, the present study aimed to investigate the nature of the relationships 
among safety climate, human factors in driving, driver stress, risky driving and 
accidents in the context of professional driving.  
More specifically, the study has the following objectives of: 
• Investigating the differences among driver groups (taxi drivers, minibus 
drivers, heavy vehicle drivers, and non-professional drivers) in terms of stress 
reactions, speeding, penalties and accident involvement (Sub-study I).  
• Investigating the relationships between driver stress and risky driving including 
speeding, penalties and accident involvement (Sub-study I).  




• Investigating the relationships among safety climate and professional drivers’ 
driver behaviours, performance and accident involvement.  
• The relationships between safety climate and driver behaviours of 
professional drivers were investigated (Sub-studies II, III, IV). 
• The relationships between safety climate and driver performance of 
professional drivers were investigated (Sub-study IV). 
• The relationship between safety climate and accident involvement of 
professional drivers was investigated (Sub-study III).  
 
2. METHOD 
2.1 General outline of the study 
The present study included four sub-studies. The sample of the sub-studies 
consisted of professional and non-professional male drivers. The professional drivers 
were from different driver groups (i.e., taxi, minibus, bus, and heavy vehicle drivers). 
The data was collected via questionnaires for all sub studies, and both descriptive 
and inferential statistical analyses were conducted to analyse the data. Before 
providing more detailed information, Table 1 proposes overall information about the 
participants, measures and the statistical analyses used in each sub-study. 
 
Table 1. General information about the sub-studies of the present study. 
 
 Participants* Measures Statistical Analyses**  
Sub-study I A total of 234 
professional non-
professional male drivers 
The Driver Stress Inventory 
Demographic Information Form 
Bivariate Correlation 
Analysis of Covariance 
Hierarchical Regression 
Logistic Regression 
Sub-study II A total of 230 
professional male drivers 















Table 1. cont. 
 Participants* Measures Statistical Analyses**  
Sub-study III A total of 73 professional 
male drivers 
The Driver Behaviour 
Questionnaire 
Organizational Safety Culture 
Scale 




Sub-study IV A total of 223 
professional male drivers 
The Driver Behaviour 
Questionnaire 
The Driver Skill Inventory 
Transportation Companies’ 
Climate Scale 




* For the sub-studies II and IV, the same dataset was used. ** All analyses were conducted by using the statistical package 
SPSS (SPSS Inc, Chicago IL) 
 
2.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Sub-study I 
In the first Sub-study, taxi drivers (N = 69); minibus drivers (N = 63); heavy vehicle 
drivers (N = 64); and non-professional drivers (N = 38) participated. Table 2 provides 
the demographic information concerning the variables of interest of Sub-study I. 
Table 2. Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) values of age, annual mileage, period of driving license, and number 
of accidents for the four driver groups involved in the study 
 
 
N Age Annual Mileage Age of Driving License 
Number of Accidents 
(within the last three 
years) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Taxi 69 39.09 11.57 53.920 46.666 17.56 10.37 1.09 1.72 
Minibus 63 41.41 9.77 55.431 33.312 18.11 8.00 1.57 3.69 
Heavy Vehicle 64 38.56 8.07 95.481 124.555 17.63 6.913 1.37 2.13 
Non-Prof. 38 39.71 11.89 17.247 217.798 15.66 9.533 1.21 4.84 
 
Sub-study II and Sub-study IV  
For Sub-study II, a total of 230 professional drivers from eight different public and 
private people/good transportation companies participated in the study. The mean 
age of the drivers was 39.2 years (SD = 7.96), the average annual mileage was 
91,557 km (SD = 43,142, range = 10,000–160,000 km) and they had driven 17.7 
years on average. Although the data set used for the Sub-study IV is the same with 
the one used for Sub-study II, for the latter one, the data from 223 of the 230 male 
professional driver participants was included in the analyses because of missing data 
on some scales used in Sub-study IV. The professional drivers included in Sub-study 
IV had the mean age of 39.16 years (SD = 7.96) and the average annual mileage 
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(the distance has been driven) of 100.37 km (SD = 48.65, range = 12.000-190.000 
km). The participants had driven 17.7 years in average and the mean number of 
accidents they had been involved within the last three years was 0.77 (SD = 1.36). 
Sub-study III 
The Sub-study had a total of 73 professional male driver participants (38 taxi drivers 
and 35 cargo company drivers). The mean age of the drivers was 35.18 years (SD = 
7.12) and the average annual mileage was 74.080 km (SD = 73.072). The 
participants had 13.6 years of mean driving experience, and the mean number of 
accidents they were involved was 1.33. 
Procedure 
For all Sub-studies, the same recruitment methods were applied to recruit the 
participants from different driver groups in order to eliminate the possible sampling 
bias. The professional drivers were recruited first by contacting their 
companies/employees for permission, and then they were individually asked to 
participate in the study. The non-professional drivers, in Sub-study I, were directly 
asked to participate in the study. All the participants participated in the study upon 
their personal acceptance. The participants were assured about confidentiality and 
not compensated for their participation in the study.  
2.1.2 Measures 
Demographic variables: Demographic information form 
The participants of the Sub-studies were asked to provide information on age, annual 
mileage, years a full driving license is held, number of accidents, type of accidents, 
frequency and the type of penalties. Type of accidents information was collected for 
work hours and out of work hours separately; both passive and active accidents 
within the last three years were asked to be reported. The question to gather the 
related information was: ‘within the last three years how many times did you have an 
accident without considering seriousness of it?’ Considering penalties/offenses the 
information was gathered on parking, speed violation, overtaking and any other kind 
of penalties that the driver had within the last three years. The question to gather the 
related information was: ‘How many times did you get the following traffic penalties 
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within the last three years?’ For speeding, both in-city and highway roads were 
focuses while collecting the data via the question of ‘under normal weather and road 
conditions how fast do you drive on in-city/highway roads on average?’ The total 
number of accidents and penalties were measured via the demographic information 
form, because it was the only possible way to gather data on different types of 
accidents. 
Driver behaviours: The Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ) 
The DBQ was used in Sub-studies II, III, and IV to collect driver behaviour data from 
professional drivers. To measure the violations and errors, the DBQ with extended 
violations scale was used. Only the violation and error scales of the DBQ were used, 
because the lapses are not critical for safety and are mostly relevant only for the 
elderly drivers (Parker et al., 2000). The Positive Driver Behaviours Scale (Özkan & 
Lajunen, 2005), which was developed to measure driver behaviours conducted with 
positive intentions, was also used together with the DBQ. The Turkish translation and 
the factor structure of the DBQ have been validated in studies conducted among both 
professional (Sümer & Özkan, 2002) and non-professional drivers (Sümer et al., 
2002). The participants were asked to evaluate each item on a 6-point Likert-type 
scale (1 = never, 6 = always). Cronbach’s Alpha internal consistency scores of the 
errors, violation, and positive driver behaviours scales for the Sub-studies II, III, and 
IV were as follows respectively: 0.89, 0.79, 0.89 for errors (8 items); 0.91, 0.85, 0.92 
for violations (13 items); and 0.92, 0.89, 0.92 for positive behaviours (8 items). 
Driver performance: The Driver Skill Inventory (DSI) 
The DSI was used in Sub-study IV to gather driver performance information. The 
short version of the DSI which was used in the present study is a 10-item self-report 
measure of perceptual-motor (including 5 items; e.g. ‘fluent driving’) and safety skills 
(including 5 items; e.g. ‘avoiding unnecessary risks’) (Lajunen & Summala, 1995). 
Drivers were asked to rate each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = very weak, 4 
= very strong). For the present study, Cronbach's Alpha for internal consistency 





Driver stress: The Driver Stress Inventory 
Forty eight-item version of the Driver Stress Inventory was used to measure stress 
reactions of the drivers in Sub-study I. The original factor structure of the Driver 
Stress Inventory was applied in the present study. The Driver Stress Inventory 
includes five distinct dimensions of stress vulnerability. These dimensions are dislike 
of driving with 12 items (e.g., I feel tense or nervous when overtaking another 
vehicle), aggression with 12 items (e.g., I really dislike other drivers who cause me 
problems), fatigue proneness with 8 items (e.g., I become inattentive to road signs 
when I have to drive for several hours), hazard monitoring with 8 items (e.g., I make 
an effort to look for potential hazards when driving), and thrill seeking with 8 items (I 
get a real thrill out of driving fast). The participants were asked to evaluate each item 
on a 10-point scale. 
Organizational safety climate 
Sub-study II: Hofstede’s Organizational Culture Scale 
The original scale consists of 43 items measuring six organizational culture 
dimensions: process oriented versus results oriented;employee oriented versus job 
oriented; parochial versus professional; open versus closed; loose versus tight; 
normative versus pragmatic. Hofstede (1998) determined three items for each 
dimension as the key indicators for that dimension. In the present study, these 18 
items were used for measuring the six organizational culture dimensions. The 
participants were asked to evaluate each item on a 5-point Likert type scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). After conducting factor analyses, two-factor 
solution was ended up. The factors were named as work orientation and employee 
consideration. Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliabilities for these two scales 
were 0.79 and 0.68, respectively (see Sub-study II for more detailed information on 
the scale). 
Sub-study III: Organizational Safety Culture Scale 
An organizational safety culture scale was developed within Sub-study III to collect 
information about the drivers’ perceptions of the safety culture of the company in 
which they were working. The scale consisted of 15 items measuring three safety 
culture dimensions of traffic safety, general safety, and work safety (see Sub-study III 
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for more detailed information on the scale). Internal consistency reliabilities for these 
three factors were 0.85, 0.74, and 0.92, respectively. The participants were asked to 
evaluate each item on a 5-point Likert type scale (1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 5 = 
‘strongly agree’). 
Sub-study IV: Transportation Companies' Climate Scale (TCCS) 
Scale development: Transportation Companies' Climate Scale – the TCCS (Sub-
study IV): In the process of development of the TCCS a comprehensive literature 
search was conducted to find out the studies on safety culture/climate, and the 
studies targeting different sectors were reviewed to figure out the main dimensions of 
safety culture/climate in general, and statements/items placed under those 
dimensions. Among these statements/items the ones that can be adapted into the 
safety culture/climate scale to be used for professional drivers were selected by the 
last two authors of the Sub-study IV. Previously determined main dimensions were 
differentiated as safety climate and safety culture dimensions and the selected items 
were placed under the dimension that they are belong to. In addition to the 
evaluations of the two authors of the Sub-study IV, the listed safety climate 
dimensions and items were also evaluated in a panel including professional drivers 
(N=2) and their manager in terms of items’ importance and frequency in relation to 
the task (i.e., driving as a professional driver in a company). The evaluators were 
asked to add new items if they consider it necessary to do so. As a result, sixty-one 
items were indicated to be the important ones for measuring transportation 
companies’ climate. After that, the same evaluators were asked to determine the 
dimensions which are important for transportation companies climate and this 
process culminated in the following dimensions: safety management and 
organizational commitment to safety, job security and safety concerns, specific 
prevention strategies for safety, work and time pressure, safety communication in 
trip, passengers/customers’ commitment to safety, drivers’ commitment to safety in 
trip, reward system for safe trip, selection of drivers for safe trip, training of drivers for 
safe trip, and control/check points during the trip. On the next step, the same group 
of evaluators were asked to classify these dimensions into categories in terms of 
their relevance to the main tasks of drivers and companies’ ‘ways of doings’ in 
transportation. Two main categories were obtained and named as Policy-focused 
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Safety Orientation (PfSO), and Transport/Trip-focused Safety Orientation (TfPO). 
Next, the same evaluators were asked to classify the sixty-one items within one of 
the PfSO or TfPO categories. Lastly, they were asked to decide which item should be 
placed under which factor within the category.  
In the present study the PfSO dimensions including thirty-three items were included. 
The scale including 31 of those 33 items was named as the TCCS in the Sub-study 
IV, and included three dimensions of general safety management, specific practices 
and precautions, work and time pressure (see Sub-study IV for the items of the 
TCCS). The drivers were asked to evaluate each item on a 5-point Likert type scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Cronbach's Alpha for internal consistency 
scores for the general safety management, specific practices and precautions, work 
and time pressure dimensions were 0.92, 0.82, and 0.78, respectively. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Comparison of professional and non-professional driver groups in terms of 
stress reactions, speeding, number of penalties and accident involvement 
(Sub-study I) 
After controlling the effects of age and annual mileage, ANCOVA results for stress 
reactions indicated differences between different driver groups in three dimensions of 
the Driver Stress Inventory (see Table 3). Minibus drivers were more aggressive 
compared to the non-professional drivers. Non-professional drivers were better in 
hazard monitoring in traffic compared to the minibus and heavy vehicle drivers. 
Finally, heavy vehicle drivers reported more fatigue proneness compared to non-
professional drivers. There were no significant differences among different driver 
groups on dislike of driving and thrill-seeking. 
Table 3. ANCOVA results for the sub dimension of the Driver Stress Inventory 
 Non-Professional Heavy Vehicle   Taxi Minibus      F 
Aggression  48.22a 53.93ab  55.71ab   62.49b    4.95* 
Hazard Monitoring 64.29a 51.36b  56.62ab   52.05b    4.40* 
Fatigue Proneness  41.56a 56.68b  50.69ab   51.46ab    3.90* 
Dislike of Driving 33.64 29.60  33.29   30.94    1.04 
Thrill-seeking 34.77 42.28  41.18   48.18    1.98 
Note: Bonferroni correction was used for pairwise comparisons. Mean values with different superscripts within rows are 




Results of the ANCOVAs revealed group differences in speeding and number of 
penalties. As Table 4 shows, ANCOVA results for speeding and number of penalties 
revealed that the non-professional drivers drove faster than the heavy vehicle, taxi, 
and minibus drivers on highways, and faster than the heavy vehicle and minibus 
drivers on in-city roads. Besides, the minibus drivers reported more penalties than 
the heavy vehicle and non-professional drivers. There were no significant differences 
among different driver groups in accident involvement. 
 
Table 4. ANCOVA results for speeding and number of penalties  
 Non-Professional Heavy Vehicle Taxi Minibus F 
Speeding on Highways 106.45a 89.35b 95.28b 96.01b 7.97** 
Speeding on In-City Roads 62.94a 53.72b 56.62ab 53.24b 3.80* 
Number of Penalties 1.54a 1.09a 1.58ab 2.39b 3.54* 
Note: Bonferroni correction was used for pairwise comparisons. Mean values with different superscripts within rows are 
statistically different from each other. *p<.05, **p<.001  
3.2 Relationships between driver stress and risky driving including speeding, 
penalties and accident involvement (Sub-study I) 
Relationships among the Driver Stress Inventory dimensions and variables of interest 
(i.e., speeding, penalties, and accidents) were investigated via two sets of regression 
analyses. In the first set of regression analyses, number of accidents and number of 
penalties were used as the dependent variables. In these logistic regression 
analyses, age and annual km were entered in the first step, and the driver group was 
entered in the second step. After controlling the effects of these variables the effects 
of the Driver Stress Inventory dimensions were entered in the third step. As a result, 
aggression (B= 0.04, SE = 0.02, Wald = 6.04, p < 0.01), dislike of driving (B= 0.03, 
SE = 0.02, Wald = 4.34, p < 0.05), and hazard monitoring (B= 0.04, SE = 0.01, Wald 
= 9.10, p < 0.001) dimensions were related to accident involvement. Accidents were 
more frequently reported by the drivers with higher aggression, dislike of driving and 
hazard monitoring scores. None of the dimensions were related to the number of 
penalties. 
In the second set of regression analyses, speeding on in-city roads and on highways 
were used as the dependent variables. The Driver Stress Inventory dimensions were 
forced into the model. The results of the hierarchical regression analyses indicated 
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that aggression (= 0.25, F(5, 234) = 4.47, p<0.05) and thrill-seeking (= -0.33, F(5, 
234) = 4.47, p<0.01) were related to speeding on in-city roads. Drivers reported 
higher speeds on in-city roads when they have high aggression scores whereas 
slower speeds on in-city roads were reported by the drivers with higher thrill-seeking 
scores.  
3.3 Factor structure of safety climate for professional drivers (Sub-studies II, III, 
IV) 
In the present study, in three of the four Sub-studies factor structures of safety 
climate scales were investigated. In Sub-study II, a previously developed 
organizational safety culture scale (Hofstede, 1998) has been used. For the Sub-
studies III and IV the scales specifically developed for professional drivers were 
used. The factors derived from the factor analyses conducted within  the three Sub-
studies were presented in Table 5.  
Table 5. Factors determined for each sub-study after the factor analyses.  
 
Sub-study II Sub-study III Sub-study IV 














and Precautions  
(8 items) 
 Work Safety (5 items) 
Work and Time 
Pressure  
(7 items) 
                       Note: For the items loaded into the factors original publications should be seen 
 
In Sub-study II, internal consistency reliability analyses showed remarkably low 
(range: 0.34–0.76) Cronbach’s Alpha values for internal consistency (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007) for the original version of Hofstede’s Organizational Culture Scale 
(Hofstede, 1998) with six dimensions (process oriented versus results oriented;
employee oriented versus job oriented; parochial versus professional; open versus 
closed; loose versus tight; normative versus pragmatic). To compute more reliable 
scales, principal component factor analyses were performed for the 18 items of these 
six dimensions. The number of factors was determined by using eigen values, the 
scree plot and the parallel analysis. A factor loading value of 0.30 was determined as 
the cut-off score for including the item into the scale. As a result, a two-factor solution 
was found to be the most interpretable one. The first factor was named as work 
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orientation considering the content of the items in this dimension. This factor included 
seven items, and explained 25.6% of the total variance. Work orientation refers to the 
importance given by the organization to the work being done, the result of the work, 
the working style of the employees, and the rules for doing specific work related 
tasks. The second factor was named as employee consideration. This factor included 
nine items, which accounted for 9.7% of the total variance. Employee consideration 
refers to the degree to which employees are considered as individually important, are 
involved in decision making processes and their adaptation to the organization is 
considered important. Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliabilities for these two 
scales were 0.79 and 0.68, respectively. 
For both Sub-studies III and IV, factor analyses with principal axis factoring method 
were conducted and the number of factors was determined by using eigen values 
(eigen values>1.0 were acceptable), factor loadings (value of 0.30 was determined 
as the cut off score), the scree plot and the conceptual relevance of the items to the 
dimension that they are loaded. Additionally, for both Sub-studies, factor analyses 
revealed three-factor solutions as the best solution. In Sub-study III, the first factor 
was named as traffic safety. This factor included seven items, and accounted for 39.4 
per cent of the variance. The second factor was named as general safety and 
included three items accounting for 9.1 per cent of the variance. The third factor was 
named as work safety and it included five items, which accounted for 5.4 per cent of 
the variance. Internal consistency reliabilities for these three factors were 0.85, 0.74, 
and 0.92, respectively. Traffic safety is related to technical traffic related issues like 
monitoring the newly applied traffic rules and regulations, technical service check of 
the vehicles, providing the drivers with first aid information. General safety is related 
to the distribution of work load and time pressure under normal and urgent 
conditions. Work safety has aspects related to the general use of all equipments and 
sources for the purpose of work safety, as well as the aspects on the control 
regarding obeying those work safety related rules and regulations.  
In Sub-study IV, the first factor was named as general safety management because 
the content of the items were about the safety commitment within the organization in 
a general and at a broader level. The drivers’ general perceptions about the 
applications, rules and regulations which might constitute base for the more detailed 
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ones were mentioned. This factor included 16 items, and explained 30.35 of the total 
variance. The second factor was named as specific practices and precautions. The 
content of the items emphasized more detailed and specific safety related 
applications and prevention strategies within the organization. This factor included 8 
items, which accounted for 10.13% of the total variance. The third factor was named 
as work and time pressure. The items loaded in this factor were directly related to the 
pressure that the drivers felt related to the work itself and being on time. That is, 
within this dimension work and time pressure aspects of safe driving were 
emphasized specifically. This last factor included 7 items, which accounted for 6.52 
of the total variance. 
3.4 Safety climate in relation to driver behaviours of professional drivers (Sub-
studies II, III, IV) 
ANCOVAs and hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate the 
relationship between safety climate and driver behaviours of professional drivers 
within three Sub-studies of the present study. The 2X2 ANCOVAs, in the Sub-study 
II, were conducted to test whether mean differences in the DBQ dimensions (errors, 
violations and positive driver behaviours) between safety climate groups (high versus 
low work orientation/employee consideration) are significant after removing the 
effects of covariates (age, annual mileage and organization types). The safety 
climate groups were ended up as a result of the factor analysis of Hofstede’s six 
organizational culture dimensions. In each of three ANCOVAs, work orientation (low 
versus high) and employee consideration (low versus high) dimensions of 
organizational climate were the independent variables; age, annual mileage and 
organization type variables were treated as the covariates. Results of the ANCOVA 
analyses revealed significant main effect of work orientation on error scores, F(1, 
124) = 6.14, p<0.05, and violation scores, F(1, 124) = 5.16, p<0.05, but not for 
positive driver behaviours. Drivers with low scores of work orientation reported 
significantly higher frequencies of errors and violations as compared to the drivers 
with high scores of work orientation. It was also found that drivers with low scores of 
employee consideration reported higher frequencies of errors and violations 
compared to the drivers with high scores of employee consideration. The interaction 
test revealed significant results for violations, F(1, 124) = 3.93, p<0.05. It was found 
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that the effects of work orientation on violation scores are different for different levels 
of employee consideration.  
                 Work Orientation (WO)





















Figure 1. The interaction between organizational climate dimensions (Work Orientation and Employee 
Consideration) on violations. 
 
As Figure 1, explains, the highest frequency for violation was reported when both 
work orientation and employee consideration scores are low (i.e., low organizational 
importance on the work being done, rules and regulations, etc.; and the employees 
are given less consideration for their presence in and adaptation to the organization, 
etc.). The lowest violation frequencies were reported when work orientation scores 
are high but employee consideration scores are low (i.e., high organizational 
importance on the work being done, rules and regulations, etc.; but the employees 
are given less consideration for their presence in and adaptation to the organization, 
etc.). 
In Sub-studies III and IV, hierarchical regression analyses were performed to 
investigate the relationship between safety culture and driver behaviours. In each 
analysis, effects of age and mileage were controlled by forcing them into the model at 
the first step. In the second step, safety climate dimensions were entered into the 
model. For the Sub-study III, traffic safety dimension of climate was negatively 
related to violations ( = -0.50, F(5, 73) = 2.87, p<0.01). Work safety dimension was 
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positively related to both violations (= 0.37, F(5, 73) = 2.87, p<0.05) and errors ( = 
0.40, F(5, 73) = 3.47, p<0.01). General safety dimension was negatively related to 
errors ( = -0.34, F(5, 73) = 3.47, p<0.01). That is, when organization is perceived as 
emphasizing safe driving, by following traffic rules and regulations, monitoring 
technical service check of the vehicles and applying training programs for safe 
driving, drivers reported to have low frequencies of violations. When the drivers think 
that safety related policies, applications, attempts, and controls within the 
organization are strong, and the equipments are used for the purpose of work safety 
they reported more frequent errors and violations. Errors were reported less 
frequently by the drivers of organizations where work load and time pressure 
arrangements are made considering safety into account. In the Sub-study IV, safety 
climate dimensions of general safety management, specific practices and 
precautions, and work and time pressure were investigated regarding their relation to 
driver behaviours. The results revealed that only work and time pressure was related 
to violations ( = -0.40, F(5, 223) = 6.38, p<0.001) and errors ( = -0.33, F(5, 223) = 
4.05, p<0.001). When work and time pressure is given high importance within the 
organization, less frequent errors and violations were reported.  
3.5 Safety climate in relation to driver performance of professional drivers 
(Sub-study IV) 
In Sub-study IV, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate 
safety climate in relation to perceptual-motor skills and safety skills dimensions of 
driver performance. In order to control for the statistical effects of age and annual 
mileage, these two variables were entered into the model in the first step. In the 
second step, general safety management, specific practices and precautions, and 
work and time pressure dimensions of safety climate were entered into to the model. 
The results revealed that only general safety management was related to safety skills 
( = 0.24, F(5, 223) = 7.06, p<0.001). When organization‘s commitment to safety is 
high and it is performed into the general safety management practices, drivers 




3.6 Safety climate in relation to accident involvement of professional drivers 
(Sub-study III) 
In order to investigate the relationships between organizational safety climate and 
accidents of professional drivers, multiple regression analysis was conducted. In the 
analysis, effects of age and mileage were controlled by forcing them into the model at 
the first step. In the second step, organizational safety climate dimensions were 
entered into the model. According to the results of regression analysis both traffic 
safety ( = -0.30, F(5, 73) = 1.89, p<0.05) and general safety ( = -0.29, F(5, 73) = 
1.89, p<0.05) dimensions of climate were negatively related to accidents. When 
organization is perceived as emphasizing safe driving, by following traffic rules and 
regulations, applying training programs for safe driving, and work load and time 
pressure arrangements are made considering safety into account, drivers reported to 
have less frequent accidents.   
4. DISCUSSION 
Comparison of different professional and non-professional driver groups 
Concerning the differences between professional and non-professional drivers, 
results supported earlier findings indicating that these two groups of drivers differ in 
their stress reactions and risky driving behaviours (e.g., Matthews et al., 1999; 
Rosenbloom & Shahar, 2007). The present study indicated that non-professional 
drivers drove faster on both in-city roads and highways as compared to the taxi, 
minibus and the heavy vehicle drivers; they also were better in hazard monitoring in 
traffic as compared to the minibus drivers and heavy vehicle drivers. Whereas heavy 
vehicle drivers reported more fatigue proneness as compared to the non-professional 
drivers. Depending on the literature, these results might have explanations regarding 
the effects of variety of factors (e.g., type of the vehicle, work pressure for 
professional drivers, other stress factors for both groups of drivers). It is clear from 
the results that ending up with the mentioned differences between non-professional 
and professional drivers, whereas not within professional driver groups show that 
some characteristics related to professional driving, regardless of the group the 
drivers belong to, create difference making them different from non-professional 
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drivers. The need to investigate professional drivers in terms of their characteristics 
and factors related to that group has been emphasized once more.  
According to the results of the Sub-study I, concerning the differences for different 
professional driver groups, the only significant difference was obtained for minibus 
and heavy vehicle drivers on the frequencies of penalties; the minibus drivers 
reported more penalties as compared to the heavy vehicle drivers participated in the 
study. Minibus drivers are transporting passengers; in some places they carry about 
fifteen people at once and while driving they have to stop many times for passengers 
to leave or get in. There are also some extra traffic rules for minibus drivers in 
Turkey, they have different time schedules, and any problems with not obeying such 
rules or trying to catch up with the time schedule might result in additional risky traffic 
behaviours (Karasek & Theorell, 1990). Another explanation might be related to the 
fact that heavy vehicle drivers who do very different type of transportation compared 
to minibus drivers, drive mostly on highways, not on in-city roads. This fact might 
influence the frequency of penalties, as there are different penalty related rules for in-
city roads and highways. Additionally, different traffic situations take place on 
highways and in-city roads which might lead up to different probabilities of having 
penalties. That is, the type of exposure as well as the amount of it should be taken 
into account as well.    
Considering the stress reactions-risky driving relationship, aggressive drivers had 
higher speed on in-city roads and involved in higher number of accidents, as 
congruent with the findings indicating associations between aggression and some 
deliberate violations like speeding (e.g., Matthews et al., 1997). Similarly, regression 
analyses revealed that drivers with high dislike of driving scores were involved in 
higher number of accidents. According to Matthews (2001), high dislike of driving 
scores may interfere with task performance because it might generate negative mood 
states. By nature, high scores on the thrill-seeking and hazard monitoring dimensions 
of the Driver Stress Inventory should be related to more risky driving style and being 
aware of danger faster, respectively. However, the results of the present study 
indicated that drivers with high thrill-seeking scores drove slower on in-city roads and 
that the drivers with high hazard monitoring scores were involved in higher number of 
accidents. Different explanations are possible for these unexpected results. For 
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example, effects of some other factors, like risk perception, and overestimation of 
hazard perception might explain these results. High level of thrill-seeking could be 
expressed as over speeding only on the certain types of roads (i.e., motorway). In 
summary, the present study showed that professional drivers are more prone to 
stress reactions in traffic and to commit more frequent risky traffic behaviours as 
compared to non-professional drivers.  
Safety Climate in relation to driver behaviour and performance, and accident 
involvement 
Considering the relationships between safety climate and human factors of driving, 
three sub-studies revealed significant and similar results. As for driver behaviours 
significant relationships were obtained for both errors and violations in three Sub-
studies. In more detail, the studies indicated that as the organization gives priority to 
traffic and vehicle related factors, fewer violations were observed (Sub-study III). 
Similarly, when professional drivers reported the organization they are working for as 
arranging work load and job related time pressure by giving priority to safety, they 
reported fewer violations (Sub-study IV) and errors (Sub-studies III and IV). That is, if 
safety rules and regulations are strictly applied even in the case of time pressure, 
and the work load is arranged by taking safety of employees and passengers into 
account, fewer violations and errors appear to be committed. Results of the Sub-
study II explained that, when professional drivers perceive their work environment as 
cost-conscious, having clear time schedules, etc., in other words, being high in work 
orientation, they reported lower frequencies of driving errors and violations. This 
result might indicate that clear internal structure brings clarity in discipline, control, 
application of the rules, and clarity of the jobs to organizations and to professional 
drivers working for those organizations (see Hofstede, 2001).  
There was, also an interaction of work orientation and employee consideration on 
professional drivers’ self-reported frequencies of violations. As the drivers reported 
that low consideration had been given for their place and presence in the 
organization, and when the organizational rules, structures, regulations and the work 
being done are loosely followed, they reported the highest frequency of violations. On 
the other hand, when the drivers reported that the style of work, rules and regulations 
were strictly controlled while they were given low consideration for their presence 
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within the organization, they reported the lowest frequency of violations. The results 
clearly indicate the importance of safety climate in safe driving and traffic safety. The 
stronger the work orientation cultures that transportation companies establish and 
enforce, the less frequent errors and violations appear to be committed. In the former 
result it can be inferred that a well structured work system encouraged the drivers to 
follow planned actions to achieve the intended consequences, as Reason et al. 
(1990) mentioned in defining errors. In the latter one, it is clear that if the drivers 
perceive the organization as ‘loose’ in terms of the approach to the work being done 
and lacking consideration for their personal place and value in the organization, they 
tend to be involved in a higher frequency of deliberate deviations from the practices 
believed necessary to maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system, 
as Reason et al. (1990) defined violations. These results of the present study were in 
line with some earlier findings indicating that organizational culture has an impact on 
employee behaviour and outcomes (e.g., Øgaard et al., 2005; Schein, 1984). More 
specifically, Haworth et al. (2000) told that higher number of errors and higher levels 
of work pressure were found to be the predictors of work related accidents. That is, 
higher work pressure correlated with higher frequencies of errors. Another similar 
result provided by Vredenburgh (2002), who stated that if organization’s cultural 
message is that production, not people or safety, is the priority, employees might 
perceive loose organizational safety, which, in turn, may affect their safety 
performance negatively. Rundmo and Hale (2003) conducted a study investigating 
an industrial company’s managers’ attitudes towards safety and accident prevention. 
Results indicated safety attitudes of managers (e.g., high safety priority, high risk 
awareness) to be important causal factors for their behaviour.     
The last findings regarding the relationship between safety climate and driver 
behaviours infers positive relationships of high work safety with self-reported number 
of errors and violations (Sub-study III). In other words, if the drivers found company’s 
safety regulations satisfactory, company’s investment in safety sufficient, and think 
that safety has a priority, they reported more errors and violations. These results 
being in conflict with the previous literature might be influenced from the type of 
drivers included in the study. That is, the nature of the job and some task or job 
related characteristics, rather than climate, could be influencing the results for taxi 
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and cargo drivers. For example, structure of (e.g., time schedules) and power 
distribution within the organization (Antonsen, 2009) might be investigated in terms of 
their effects on driver behaviours. Hofmann and Stetzer (1998) indicated that 
communication, as an intervening variable, might be important in understanding 
safety related behaviours within organizations. In a similar vein, Westrum (2004) 
argued that culture seems to be strongly related to safety in such a way that the 
processes related to fixing the hidden problems seem to be strongly connected to 
detection, reporting, problem solving, and implementation, which are shaped with 
information flow within the organization, basically from leaders to the employees. For 
both taxi and cargo company drivers the structure and content of safety climate and 
accordingly the drivers understanding of climate might be different as compared to 
some other professional drivers. The taxi stops or cargo companies in Turkey are 
mostly questionable in terms of both being ‘proper’ organizations regarding their 
structure, and for the measurement of safety climate in the way it has been 
conducted within the present study. The present study has shown that even in such 
organizations where it is very difficult to mention about corporate characteristics it 
might be possible to talk about safety climate. However, the way safety culture and 
climate should be studied within such organizations, and the factors should be 
investigated together with or separately from safety climate might be important points 
to discuss for the future studies. Relating to the relationship between safety climate 
and positive driver behaviours, none of the sub-studies have resulted in significant 
results. It could be claimed that positive driver behaviours might be related to some 
internal factors like personality, attention capacity and information processing, rather 
than being related to the external factors like organizational climate. 
Results of the Sub-study IV indicated that general safety management was related to 
safety driving skills of the professional drivers. Regression results showed that if the 
professional drivers perceive management as committed to create a safe work 
environment in general, if the management’s general understanding within the 
organization is safety focused, the drivers reported higher safety skills and, hopefully, 
behave accordingly. As a result, it might be possible to argue that in such 
organizations, personnel related decisions like employment, disemployment, 
selection, rewarding, career development and training should emphasize hiring 
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drivers with higher safety skills, and trying to make the employees working for the 
organization to have higher safety skills through training. The regression analyses did 
not provide significant results for organizational safety climate's relationship with 
perceptual-motor skills. As in the case of positive driver behaviours, it could be 
claimed that perceptual-motor skills might be related to some other factors rather 
than safety climate. 
The relationship between safety climate and accident involvement has been 
investigated in the Sub-study III. According to the results, general safety dimension of 
safety climate had a negative relationship with self-reported accidents. This finding is 
in line with those of Vuuren (2000), who evidenced that improvement in company’s 
safety climate resulted in a significant decreases in accident rate. Similarly, 
Kirschenbaum et al. (2000) reported that hazardous working conditions increased 
chances of being involved in an accident. Moreover, Hayes et al. (1998) stated that 
positive employee perceptions of safety are related to low accident rates.  
A tentative model: A route for the relationships among safety climate, driver 
behaviour and performance, driver stress and accident 
  
According to the results from the previous literature, it is not easy to tell that we have 
enough information for the understanding of the nature of professional driving, the 
factors influencing this task, and the characteristics that could make professional 
drivers different from the non-professional ones at least regarding some aspects. 
Concerning that, it is possible to talk about the need for the development of models 
explaining professional driving in relation to driving related variables and outcomes. 
Depending on the results of the sub-studies included in the present study and 
support from the previous literature, a tentative model has been developed (see 
Figure 2). The model describes a route that factors from different levels influence 















Figure 2.The tentative model describing relationships among safety climate, human factors, driver stress, and 
accident involvement concerning professional driving. 
 
According to James and Jones (1974) organizational climate could be differentiated 
into two: structural properties of organization, like size and structure; and employees’ 
perceptions about aspects of organizational environment. Similarly it was argued that 
culture should be investigated as interacting with other predominant characteristics of 
the organization. Guldenmund (2010) mentioned about an organizational triangle 
where three major forces operating within the organizations at the same time. The 
first one is the structure of the organization. Structure implies the formal organization 
covering for example the allocation of power within the organization, the mechanisms 
of coordination and control. That is, who is imposing the mission in what ways is 
emphasized. The second force is the culture of the organization including the basic 
assumptions and underlying convictions. This conviction is seen back in the structure 
and on the work floor. For example, conviction might influence how the supervisors 
are situated in the structure both organizationally and structurally. The last force is 
the process, which means actually primary processes exist in the entire organization. 
For example, a supervisor’s aim might be to ensure commitment and reduce the 
violations. As a result of the interaction of these three forces behaviour is determined 
within the organization. The proposed model includes those aspects of organization 
as well to provide a complete picture of the concept of safety climate. 
The model infers a relationship between safety climate and accidents through human 
factors, i.e., driver behaviours and performance. Driver stress was added into the 













on human factors. In other words, in this moderated mediation model (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986), or the model including conditional indirect affects (Preacher et al., 
2007) the strength of the relationship between safety climate and accident 
involvement, through human factors, will be different for different types of driver 
stress. The relationship between safety climate and human factors (Sub-studies II, III 
and IV) and the one between safety climate and accident involvement (Sub-study III) 
has been evidenced in the present study. Also the present study showed that, 
although within group differences were observed for professional drivers in terms of 
stress reactions and risk driving (Sub-study I), these differences were not significant. 
However, there were significant differences in terms of the mentioned factors 
between non-professional and professional driver groups. Thus it might be argued 
that, some characteristics, (rather than the driver group/type) related to being a 
professional driver should be investigated while studying professional driving. This 
factor might be safety climate as it was proposed in Figure 2. Although the 
relationships between human factors and accident involvement have not been 
studied in the present study, a vast amount of studies in the previous literature 
indicated the existence of this relationship (e.g., Dobson et al., 1999; Özkan & 
Lajunen, 2005; Özkan et al., 2006a; 2006b; Parker et al., 1995a; 2000).     
Driver stress, in the Sub-studies of the present study, was not investigated in relation 
to either safety climate or human factors directly. However, its relationship with 
speeding, which is a predominant violation having direct and causal relationship with 
accident involvement (e.g., Aarts & van Schangen, 2006; Carsten & Tate, 2005) was 
evidenced (Sub-study I). Additionally, the findings from the previous studies showing 
the existence of the relationship between stress and driving were used as a base to 
figure such a relationship for the proposed model. Westerman and Haigney (2000) 
conducted the first and the only study investigating the relationship between the DBQ 
and the DBI, which were indicated as two conceptually distinct measures. The 
researchers argued that driver stress is multi-faceted as driver behaviours, and it is 
possible that different facets of driver stress would have different influences on driver 
behaviours. Results of their study evidenced that high levels of stress is related to the 
increased self-reports of errors and violation. For instance, among the DBI factors, 
aggression/urgency accounted for the greatest amount of variance on the DBQ 
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factors. Situation specific tension and dislike of driving had also unique variances on 
each factor of the DBQ. Similarly, Simon and Corbett (1996) reported positive 
association of a measure of violation with self-report indices of general stress and 
driving aggression. According to Dorn and Matthews (1995) Driver Stress Inventory 
has showed that more severe stress reactions may disrupt driver performance and 
reduce safety.  
As indicated by Westerman and Haigney (2000) the DBQ and the DBI are 
conceptually distinct measures. Although the names indicate a behaviour component 
for both of them, in the DBI, interactive effects of the driver’s assessment of the task 
environment, his/her ability to cope with the conditions, and selection of a 
behavioural strategy has been emphasized to determine driver stress and driving 
performance, consequently. After the study of Matthews et al. (1997) the behavioural 
outcomes were kept out and the inventory has been renamed as the Driver Stress 
Inventory. In the present model, driver stress was defined according to the logic of 
the Driver Stress Inventory, and DBQ is the measurement tool used to get the driver 
behaviour information for more precise understanding of the nature of and the 
relationships between these two concepts within professional driving. 
This model is a way to investigate the cross-level interactions in professional driving. 
However, it should be noticed that the model is tentative in nature and presented as 
a possible route explaining how factors from different levels influence each other. 
Testing such a model in the future studies might provide the literature with 
considerable insight on the relationships among organizational characteristics 
concerning safety, human factors in driving, driver stress and accident involvement. 
However, it is not possible to argue that it provides a complete understanding of the 
factors related to professional driving.        
Implications of the present study 
The present research might be a small step to understand professional driving and 
the role of safety climate in professional driving. However, as the proposed model 
shows, it has implications for the present situation and directions for the future 
studies. First of all, safety climate and driver stress were modelled in relation to 
human factors and accident involvement. Although human factors, stress and 
accidents were the variables taken considerable attention from researchers 
61 
 
previously, they have not been studied in the way the present study proposed, which 
might provide an organizational frame of reference for professional driving for the 
future studies. In addition, comparisons among non-professional and different 
professional groups were limited and in the need of more detailed investigation with 
the inclusion of different driver groups. The present study provided the literature with 
some critical information regarding non-professional and professional drivers, 
including some differences among them. This new input to the literature might 
provide a base for the future studies on the characteristics and driving performance 
of different driver groups.   
Another critical implication of the study is the development of the Transportation 
Companies’ Climate Scale (TCCS), which is the first organizational climate measure 
developed specifically for the professional drivers. The TCCS has a very clear factor 
structure including three factors, supporting the literature emphasizing the 
multidimensional nature of safety climate (e.g., Cabrera et al., 1997; Zohar, 1980). 
Although some previous researchers indicated that sorting the items into a factor 
structure that has been published previously might be a way to end up with a set of 
core factors; direct comparison among the factor labels found in the previous studies 
might be problematic because of both methodological inconsistencies (i.e., 
differences in content, style, statistical analysis, sample compositions), and, cultural 
and language differences across countries and industries (see Flin et al., 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000). These circumstances make it difficult to find evidence for a 
common set of core features for the investigated concepts. Nevertheless, as Flin et 
al. (2000) pointed out, for the construct validity to be obtained different climate scales 
administered to the same workforce could be compared. As the TCCS is the first 
measure specifically developed to gather safety climate information from the 
professional drivers, it can provide a basis for such a comparison to be made in the 
future.  
CRITICAL REMARKS 
Before the concluding remarks, some critical issues related to the present study 
should be mentioned about. The first issue might be that, organizations are 
composed of both formal and informal parts. In the present study, by focusing on 
safety climate, the informal part was mentioned about, which cannot be separated 
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from the formal part in fact. Accordingly, studies covering both formal and informal 
parts, as presented in Figure 2, might provide an extended understanding of the role 
and nature of safety climate in organizational contexts. Additionally, the concept of 
safety climate has some difficulties in terms of way it is studied. Even in the most 
recent times, most studies on culture/climate are in general dealing with how it 
influences safety. However, the way cultures/climates are created and recreated did 
not take considerable attention of the researchers. In order to end up with a complete 
understanding of the concept these issues should be considered. Another issue to 
consider might be the co-existence of other types of culture/climate related 
characteristics that might be interacting with safety climate in its relationships with 
other factors (Zohar, 2008).   
Nature of the data collected/analyzed is another point to emphasize regarding the 
critical concerns of the present study. In the present study both professional and non-
professional drivers were investigated in traffic setting. For most of the time, for the 
professional drivers, the results were explained as if they constitute a single group. 
However, literature indicated that employees understanding of ‘culture’ might change 
depending on some characteristics of the organization like size (Schein, 1992) and 
type (e.g., distributed organizations) of the organizations, as well as the 
characteristics, and, formal and informal rules related to different driver groups. If all 
the subjects are treated as a single group, the influence of those factors cannot be 
differentiated. One method of avoiding this limitation is the use of multilevel modelling 
(Nezlek, 2008). As the nature of the data collected for the present study was 
multilevel (i.e., individual, group and organizational levels), it would be appropriate to 
take into account individual, group and organizational level measures to figure out 
whether they have different influences on driving and accidents. However, the 
analyses conducted for the present study with a software developed for multilevel 
analyses (HLM 6.8 – Raudenbush et al., 2004) did not reveal interpretable results as 
a result of sample size issues at ‘level 2’ (e.g., organizational level).   
Additionally, use of questionnaires and cross-sectional design of the sub-studies 
might be included as other limitations. It has been reported that climate studies were 
mostly conducted via questionnaires; even some authors argued that the culture 
studies conducted by gathering data via questionnaires are called climate research 
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(see Guldenmund, 2010). However, the use of questionnaire data might result the 
employees reflect the way they should feel, think and act regarding safety, rather 
than the way they actually feel, think and act (Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2007). 
In addition to the way they respond the questionnaire, ‘which questionnaire to use’ is 
another important issue to discuss. As for the organizational climate scale, some 
other measures to collect data should be investigated in terms of its applicability to 
any driver group. For example, the DBQ was not developed for the professional 
drivers (Wahlberg et al., 2011); a questionnaire developed to collect driver behaviour 
data from specific groups might provide more accurate information and results for the 
future studies. Concerning the cross-sectional design, it should be mentioned that 
cross-sectional studies cannot mostly determine causality which might be a critical 
problem in evaluating the results of the studies.    
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Defined as a high-risk occupation more than thirty years ago (see Baker et al., 1976) 
professional drivers have been the subject of many studies. However, safety related 
behaviours and outcomes among professional drivers have attracted very little 
attention among safety researchers (e.g., Salminen & Lähdeniemi, 2002). It has been 
indicated that the researches based on the frameworks depending on the previous 
studies would result in more extensive and precise results (Shinar, 2007). 
Additionally theories and models of driver behaviour have been indicated as essential 
to understand how change in one variable (vehicle, social environment) can influence 
behaviour (Gielen & Sleet, 2003). The sub-studies of the present study and the 
model proposed in it has mainly focused on safety climate as a predominant 
organization related factor which was thought to be critical for behaviour, 
performance and outcomes of professional driving. Considering this aspect of it, the 
present study provided a contribution to the literature regarding the needed detailed 
investigation of organizational climate as an alternative performance indicator 
(Guldenmund, 2010). 
According to the results, the present study evidenced the existence of the 
relationships among safety climate, human factors in driving and accident 
involvement. It is critical that the mentioned relationship has been evidenced via the 
use of a safety climate scale specifically developed for professional drivers. 
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Additionally, it has been shown that professional drivers are different from the non-
professional drivers in terms of risky driving and on-the-road stress reactions; in 
addition to some within group differences.      
It is clear that the future studies need a comprehensive point of view to be able to 
figure out how to construct/modify (if possible) organizational culture for safer 
organizations. In the present study a tentative model has been presented to be a part 
of a comprehensive model by providing a route to the relationships among safety 
climate, different professional driver groups, predominant factors in professional 
driving and accident involvement. As Shinar (2007) argued, models are critical as 
they describe behaviours within a framework of constructs appearing reasonable. 
Additionally they are useful because they might be considered as a tool providing 
countermeasures for behaviours (e.g., violations) and outcomes (e.g., accidents). 
Proposing a framework for the relationships among the predominant factors related 
to professional driving, the tentative model proposed in the present study could 
provide the future studies with a base where different levels of the traffic system were 
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